

059349

JPRS 82460

14 December 1982

West Europe Report

No. 2073

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

19980320 163

DTIC QUANTITY REQUESTED



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

9
78
A05

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

14 December 1982

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2073

CONTENTS

TERRORISM

FRANCE

- Mitterrand's Words, Deeds on Terrorism Reviewed
(Suzanne Labin; LE JOURNAL DU PARLEMENT, 15-30 Sep 82) ... 1

ENERGY/ECONOMICS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Nordic Countries Showing Increased Interest in Wind Power
(Etta Tallqvist; HUVUDSTADSBLADET, 31 Oct 82) 4

CYPRUS

- Briefs
Turkish Cypriot Energy Consumption 7

ECONOMIC

CYPRUS

- USSR Signs Agreement for Lemon, Orange Imports
(CYPRUS MAIL, 17 Nov 82) 8

SPAIN

- Extent of Arab Investment in Country Reported
(Ana I. Pereda; ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA, 4 Nov 82) 9

SWEDEN

- Business Institute Foresees Moderate Economic Upturn
(Jan Magnus Fahlstrom; DAGENS NYHETER, 5 Nov 82) 13

Unemployment Figures Confusing, But Improvement Indicated (Bo A. Ericsson; DAGENS NYHETER, 9 Nov 82)	15
Finance Minister: Expect Purchasing-Power Drop of Five Percent (DAGENS NYHETER, 11 Nov 82)	17
Paper Comments on Government's Economic Plan (Editorial, Nils-Eric Sandberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 11 Nov 82). .	18
Saab Presents First New Passenger Plane in a Generation (Lars Dahl; DAGENS NYHETER, 28 Oct 82)	21
SWITZERLAND	
Economic Upturn Not Expected Until Late 1983 (NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 5 Nov 82)	24
POLITICAL	
DENMARK	
Wave of Youth Protests Worries Danes as Disorders Increase (Ake Ringberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 28 Oct 82)	28
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	
Hesse Greens Set Terms for Cooperation With SPD (FRANKFURT ALLGEMEINE, 1 Nov 82)	31
Improved Relations Between Hesse SPD, Greens Reported (DER SPIEGEL, 1 Nov 82)	33
FINLAND	
Leaders From Defunct Liberal Party See Green Movement Future (Tom Vuori, Stefan Lundberg; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 31 Oct 82). .	37
SPAIN	
Fraga on Opposition Role, Future of Center (Manuel Fraga Interview; TIEMPO, 15 Nov 82)	42
MILITARY	
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS	
Joint French-Spanish Antisubmarine Maneuvers (Carlos Yarnoz; TIEMPO, 8 Nov 82)	48

SPAIN

Geostrategic Importance of Ceuta, Melilla
(Heinz Brill; EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE, Oct 82) 51

SWEDEN

Army, Navy Begin Training Program for First Women Officers
(Bengt Falkkloo; DAGENS NYHETER, 3 Nov 82) 61

Submarine Intrusion Investigative Committee Begins Work
(DAGENS NYHETER, 3 Nov 82) 63

Soviet Pilot Ignores Warning, Flies in Restricted Space
(DAGENS NYHETER, 5 Nov 82) 64

Briefs

Army Acquiring Bofors Artillery 65

GENERAL**CYPRUS**

Briefs
New Police Chief Biodata 66

ITALY

Older Population in the North in Year 2000
(Eugenio Sonnino; RINASCITA, 5 Nov 82) 67

TERRORISM

FRANCE

MITTERRAND'S WORDS, DEEDS ON TERRORISM REVIEWED

Paris LE JOURNAL DU PARLEMENT in French 15-30 Sep 82 p 6

[Article by Suzanne Labin: "Mr Mitterrand: Is the PLO a Terrorist Organization or Is It Not?"]

[Text] The press does not seem to have adequately recognized to what degree Mitterrand's speech on terrorism was teeming with evasions, evasions, double talk, and duplicity, in other words, how Mitterrandian it was.

Let us analyze one of his statements: "France's Arab policy cannot be, never has been, and never will be anti-Israeli. France's Israeli policy has never been, is not, and never will be anti-Arab."

Yet who in France is asking him, has ever asked him, or ever will ask him to pursue an anti-Arab policy? No one, least of all the Jews, who had been living on Rue des Rosiers in a good understanding with the Arabs and died at their side, victims of the same fanatics. We French, who have welcomed Arabs (Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans) in the millions to our soil, who have given them the same benefits as our own citizen workers, and who have admired the Egyptians since Sadat's unforgettable outstretched hand to Israel, have never urged Mitterrand to embark on a crusade against the Arabs. However, in a Machiavellian way this is what he implied in his speech.

What the French ask of their president is that a terrorist organization like the PLO not be recognized as a "normal nation." That it is composed of Arabs is not the issue. French people would be just as particular in the case of a Christian terrorist organization like the "Irish Revolutionary Army" or the Shintoist "Japanese Red Army" if their members came to kill Frenchmen, or if it occurred to our president to let them open a "legation" in Paris.

We are opposed to any policy which treats like a head of state the leader of an armed band which continues to spread fire and shed blood among the civil population of one country after another: Jordan, Israel and Lebanon.

Yet Mitterrand surreptitiously shifted from the PLO, whose terrorist actions arouse our indignation, to the Arab World in general, which we sincerely respect. The first treachery.

Moreover, throughout his speech Mitterrand avoided the crucial question, which is the crux of the whole policy: The PLO, is it or is it not a terrorist organization?"

And he avoided it because if he had answered "no" he would have been a liar and would have lost the votes of Jews and of their Christian friends, who are numerous. And if he had answered "yes," i.e., the truth, he would have had to clamp down on the PLO agents and expel its representative in Paris.

That is why Mitterrand hedged, as he usually does, and slipped in that little phrase, which without seeming to be significant was intended to tell everything: "The PLO has earned the right to fight." The second treachery.

This phrase justifiably earned the praise of Ibrahim Souss, the representative in Paris of Yasir Arafat, and the protests of Menachem Begin expressed as follows: "President Mitterrand is well aware of the PLO's methods of indiscriminately killing women and children. I am shocked that he should have spoken in this way." And the socialist Israeli, Shimon Peres, who has come to support Francois Mitterrand, also affirmed that the PLO is a legion of terrorists. Then why does Mitterrand try to continue to ignore this?

Mitterrand said further: "What matters is the will to drive back terrorism wherever it hides, to track it down to its roots."

That is precisely what he has not done in the 15 months he has been in office. He has even done exactly the opposite, that is, consorted with the henchmen of international terrorism. First, he took on as adviser a fellow-traveler of Cuban guerrilla leader Che Guevara, the revolutionary philosopher Regis Debray, who organized the action in Bolivia and was imprisoned for that in that country.

Later, he did not turn a hair when his prime minister, Mauroy, said that we must not confuse "terrorists" with "members of national liberation movements." (Naturally, all the dynamiters claim to want to liberate something or other). Nevertheless, this subtle distinction has enabled Mitterrand to be buddy-buddy with the so-called liberation movements (terrorists) and to go to Mexico to deliver a speech of praise and encouragement to them.

Then he agreed to his minister of culture, Jack Lang, going on a boat with Fidel Castro, who fans the fire of all the most savage terrorism in Latin America and who sends his henchmen to play with plastic explosives and bombs in Angola and even as far away as Afghanistan.

It is evident that Mitterrand does not want to track down to the the roots all the terrorist movements. Quite the contrary, he would like to award

countries to some of the most prominent, for example, Transjordan to the PLO and El Salvador to the terrorist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (name of the founder of the Salvadoran communist party). He only wants to track terrorism to the root in France (and moreover he has only wanted to do so since the crime in Rue des Rosiers). Everywhere else in the world he opens his heart to the "liberator." The proof is that among the measures he has taken there is no question of agreeing to extradition of the killers.

Let's quote further from Mitterrand's storehouse: "Any organization professing a political ideology which systematically resorts to violence will be hunted down, dissolved, and banned. And its members will be pursued, arrested and sentenced."

Fine. But why has he waited 15 long months before introducing such standard, essential measures? And why did he fail to apply them as soon as he came into office, considering that they were already in the arsenal of our laws? Why did he pardon all the terrorists that Giscard d'Estaing had imprisoned? (God knows that he also did not lack forbearance). Why has he not "pursued, arrested and sentenced" the leader of the extreme-left organization "Action Directe," which has claimed 30 acts of terrorism in our country? Worse yet, when his police had him in custody for questioning why did they release him and let him get away clear?

Shall we end with this presidential pearl: "What matters is the will to respect the law, to insure that it is applied, and to be steadfast and uncompromising in its application."

Yet how can one give the slightest credence to the same man who uttered another phrase...a leftist phrase that clearly reveals the deep feeling of the socialist leader...a phrase that heralded the soft policy that he would implement...a phrase that did not bode well for a future head of state: "I have never been a believer in the religion of order."

9920
CSO: 3519/118

NORDIC COUNTRIES SHOWING INCREASED INTEREST IN WIND POWER

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 31 Oct 82 p 14

[Article by Etta Tallqvist]

[Text] There has not been much research in the area of wind power in this country up to now, but the wind is blowing briskly and energetically round those who have devoted themselves to this study. Among them is Planning Engineer Jan Frojdman, who recently closely observed the development of this energy in Denmark and Sweden. He is also chief designer of the experimental wind power plant at Simsalo, which--if time and money allow--may go into operation next spring.

The Wind Power Association (rf), which was founded 2 years ago and now has about 300 members, is behind the project at Simsalo. The association is not a protest movement, Frojdman wants to point out. "No, we primarily want to disseminate information about wind power and how it can be used on a small scale, to heat private homes, for example. Wind power should be considered an environmentally friendly complement to other forms of energy."

The Wind Power Association's aim is to provide advice and support to those who want to buy factory-made and fully assembled wind power units or build them themselves, which many are doing. But it is also trying to establish clear guidelines as to what the requirements and specifications should be on so-called "small-scale" wind power plants, to provide directions regarding insurance, etc., and to help with questions about building permits.

By a small-scale wind power plant, Jan Frojdman means a unit that will generate an output of 0.5 to 50 kilowatts. The one at Simsalo will be 12 kilowatts. It will also provide answers to the problems that need further study. The guess is there are between 50 and 50 wind power plants in use in Finland.

Denmark a Pioneer Country

In Denmark, which like Sweden, the United States and perhaps the Netherlands and West Germany are pioneer countries in the use of wind power, the tendency is in the direction of somewhat larger units. But the government is also involved there and the price of electricity the highest in Scandinavia because Denmark does not have any water power, for example.

"The multifamily cooperative company is something that has been well developed in Denmark. A number of families that live within a 3-kilometer radius of the wind power plant jointly use the energy produced and feed the surplus of electricity into a national network.

The Danish government subsidizes the cost of constructing approved types of wind power plants by 30 percent. All types of units are being tested for a period of 4 months at the Riso test station, which was established in 1978.

As a matter of fact, Denmark holds the record for having produced electricity almost continually for 40 years by means of wind power. The construction of the 200-kilowatt direct current Godser wind power plant was one milepost and there have been a couple of others since then during the seventies: The Riisager windmill for private use and the Tvind power plant, which was constructed on the west coast of Jutland by a team of teachers and students at three schools. It was put to use in 1977 and has a maximum output of 2 megawatts.

Wind Power--What Is It?

Jan Frojdman gives this definition of what wind power actually is:

"Wind power is derived from solar energy. The sun's rays create temperature differences and thus pressure differences between masses of air, which are then set in motion. The movement of air, i.e., wind, is affected in various ways by the earth's rotation and by friction against the earth's surface, among other things."

"That is why it does not blow equally hard in Denmark and in Finland, nor in the skerries compared to the interior of the country. One has to measure in order to find out how much wind there is."

"In any case, it blows a great deal along our coastline and the average annual windspeed along the coast and in the skerries is 6 to 7 meters per second at an altitude of 10 meters. The average figures for the interior, on the other hand, is only about 3 meters per second."

Ten Percent?

Jan Frojdman has no doubt that within the foreseeable future we will also be able to cover up to 10 percent of our electrical needs in this country with the aid of wind power.

Technically we already know a great deal about this energy, but it is more difficult to calculate the present or future cost of wind power. The price is understandably influenced by energy prices in general, inflation, construction costs etc. Just a "small-scale" wind power plant for private use costs between 50,000 and 80,000 million marks today. One thing is certain, however: The expense of operating the plant for a year will not be much more than one percent of the purchasing price. The life of a unit is estimated to be about 25 years, with an overhaul every 5 years.

Lastly, Jan Frojdman mentioned that Imatran Voima also has begun research in the area of wind power. Wind measurements are being taken at three different locations in the skerries outside Aboland. The company has erected 50-meter high measuring towers in Vesterfjard, Gustavs and Rimito. After a year of collecting measurements, the company will decide whether to buy a network-connected wind power unit with a 30-meter high mast and an output of 100 to 500 kilowatts.

8952
CSO: 3650/39

ENERGY ECONOMICS

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

TURKISH CYPRIOT ENERGY CONSUMPTION--The Cyprus government has told Turkish Cypriots they are already overstepping their "unbilled consumption" account and they should not utilise more to feed their factories. This was revealed yesterday by electricity authority chairman Mr. A. Moushouttas who said that consumption in the Turkish occupied areas has increased by 3.7 per cent but in the government-controlled south by only 1.7 per cent. Mr. Moushouttas said the authority had repeatedly raised the matter of Turkish unbilled consumption with the government, which is looking into the situation. The unbilled electrical energy for the Turks during the past year calculated at the special bulk supply tariff of 38.79 mils per unit (26.73 mils in 1980) amounted to £8.1 million of which £5.1 million represented actual cost of fuel to produce this energy. Total unbilled consumption has now reached the value of £31.4 million of which £17.5 million represented fuel cost. [Text] [Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 13 Nov 82 p 1]

CSO: 3500/310

USSR SIGNS AGREEMENT FOR LEMON, ORANGE IMPORTS**Nicocia CYPRUS MAIL in English 17 Nov 82 p 1****[Excerpt]**

CYPRUS has agreed to sell 6,500 tons of lemons, to Russia at the price of approximately \$400 per ton.

The agreement was signed last week between SEDIGEP (Agricultural Products Cooperative Union Ltd) and the Soviet Trade Organisation SOYUSPLODOIMPORT, after negotiations through Delta Trading Co. Ltd in Nicosia.

The idea was raised by President Kyprianou at talks he had with the Soviet government during his recent visit to Moscow.

The first ship with 1,100 tons of lemons left for the Soviet Union last night while early next week a second one will carry other 600 tons.

It is expected that the whole quantity of 6,500 tons will be completed in December. Some 5,500 tons will be sold by the SEGIDEP and 1,000 tons by individual producers.

Reliable sources said that the Soviet Union has signed another agreement with Cyprus concerning the purchase of all quantities of the "Oval" oranges which are about

2,000 tons, at a "very satisfactory price" as were described by officials.

According to the same sources, this year Cyprus has lost the Eastern European markets for the selling of grapefruit, due to the fact Cuba has dominated these markets.

But, they added, grapefruit exports are continuing on a satisfactory level to Western European countries, such as U.K., Italy, West Germany, France and Austria.

Last year the price of Cyprus lemons per ton ranged between \$460 to \$480 and in some cases it reached \$495 per ton, which meant an average of CY£10 to 12 per thousand of lemons.

CSO: 3500/309

EXTENT OF ARAB INVESTMENT IN COUNTRY REPORTED

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 4 Nov 82 pp 37-38

/Article by Ana I. Pereda/

/Text/ Some are impatiently awaiting a shower of petrodollars; others, instead, are alarmingly reporting a new Arab invasion. One thing is certain: direct investment by Arab countries does not amount to much, and it is isolated operations of a real-estate nature which are chalking up the highest figures.

The improperly designated invasion of Arab capital in Spain has much of the utopian about it, of dreams interrupted by the scent of the petrodollar, of the hope that a tourism swimming in abundance will invade the sunny Spanish coasts.

"Except for the real-estate and banking sectors, the Arabs are not investing much in Spain; nor does Spain care about attracting Arab investors," Angel Calvo, director of the planning department of the Spanish Arab Bank (ARESBANK), told ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA. The same opinion was expressed by Jose Luis Zoreda, director of the merchant banking department of the Spanish Saudi Bank (SAUDES-BANK): "Arab investment in other countries--principally the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany--is greater than in Spain, for Spain is less aggressive than the competition; Spanish supply may at times be more interesting, but the Arabs do not know that and look upon Spain more as a tourist country." Although it is certain that, until now, Middle Eastern capital has been directed more toward the purchase of land and the construction of mansions than to investment in industry, it is not less certain that in the past 5 years Arab countries have invested a total of 4.537 billion pesetas in companies of various types, a figure which, although modest--it represents 1.38 percent of the 328.351 billion pesetas of foreign investments which have reached Spanish soil since 1977--can be interpreted as a sort of blossoming of Arab funds directed toward the peninsula.

Through Paradise

On the whole, Middle Eastern countries, including Morocco, have ranked ninth in investments in Spain during the last 5-year period, although some of the most profitable owe their favorable position in the classification to the

Arabs: "some of the investments coming from countries such as Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Luxembourg are made by Arab multinational holding companies which have their corporate headquarters in these countries for tax reasons; and this occurs both in direct investments in companies and in the purchase of shares on the stock market," Calvo said. In the classification of foreign investments during the past 5 years, Switzerland ranks second with 40.749 billion pesetas; United States heads the list with 84.992 billion invested since 1977; Luxembourg is in seventh position with 9.736 billion pesetas, just ahead of Liechtenstein (9.598 billion).

And that is why not even the powerful petrodollar can resist the attractions of the tax paradise. Among the Arab investments made through Liechtenstein in 1981, three operations deserve special mention: the payment of 812 million pesetas by part of the Kirwan Investment and Trading Company for the acquisition of 100 percent of the share capital of Kirwan Espanola; the purchase of all shares of Louisa Maria, S.A.--490 million--by part of the Al Zouhoura, Al Mountaser, Al Raya Company; and the investment of 300 million of the Al Rima, Al Nouffakia, Al Naura Company to purchase the stock of Al Rima, S.A., an export-import company with headquarters in Valencia.

The Liveliest

With 1.604 billion pesetas invested in the past 5 years, Saudi Arabia ranks first among the Arab investors who have directed funds toward Spain during this period; its principal holdings are the share capital of SAUDESBANK in which it has invested 875 million pesetas and that of Technical Transportation Equipment (EQUISA)--a company formerly controlled by the Bank of Granada and now 100 percent owned by Saudi capital--which manufactures and exports machi machinery for the Saudi airlines.

Slow Movement

(Arab investment in Spain, both direct and authorized, since 1977; in millions of pesetas)

<u>Country</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>Total since 1977</u>
Saudi Arabia	--	600	359	359	286	1,604
Lebanon	--	2	--	773	211	986
Kuwait	--	225	225	--	218	668
Libya	1	225	225	--	168	619
Jordan	--	--	291	--	--	291
Morocco	1	1	111	124	--	127
United Arab Emirates	116	--	1	--	--	116
Iran	--	--	--	68	9	77
Iraq	--	--	--	--	49	49
Total annual investment	118	1,053	1,101	1,324	941	4,537

Source: Spanish Arab Bank

Kuwait was first among the direct investors until it withdrew the 1.4 billion pesetas it had subscribed to the controversial company, Prerreducidos del Sur (PRESURSA); now it has been left in third position.

With 986 million pesetas directed toward Spain in the last 5 years, various Lebanese companies--particularly the Lebanese Hotel Company--have become majority shareholders in various hotel enterprises. Libya has virtually limited its direct investments to participation in ARESBANK, fixed at 1.575 billion pesetas; however, the role which this country is playing in the Arab investment world does not appear to stop here: "The Lebanese have traditionally been reliable financiers of the Arabs in general; the Lebanese have frequently advised other Arabs on how to invest," Calvo said.

Special Investors

Dreams interrupted by the heat of legends, which, like "The Thousand and One Nights," evoke princely mansions and palaces, are at times realized through real-estate investments in the Costa del Sol area. Nevertheless, the image of the Arab who goes around everywhere squandering his money is pure fantasy in the opinion of the director of the ARESBANK planning department: "Generally speaking, the people have a very erroneous concept of the Arabs; the idea is absolutely incorrect that the Arab financier squanders or invests his money lightly." But in addition, the Persian Gulf inhabitants display a marked preference for a specific type of operations: "The Arab investor seeks prompt liquidity and the possibility of retrieving the money invested," Zoreda says. "He prefers to invest over a short term in a project which has immediate profitability rather than in a long-term project." Nevertheless, his preference for short-term operations is not in keeping with the speed with which he finalizes contracts and operations: "In conducting business with the Arabs, one must put one's watch and calendar in a drawer; with haste one can accomplish nothing; but with patience one can achieve great things," says Jose Maria Arnau, executive vice president of the Association for Cultural and Economic Cooperation of Spain and Saudi Arabia.

Million-Peseta Mansions

Financial circles connected with Red Sea investors estimate that 50 billion pesetas has been spent by wealthy Arabs in the Spanish Costa del Sol, but Zoreda believes this figure to be excessive: "Much has been said about Arab investment in Spain, but this has been exaggerated; the figure of 50 billion pesetas is not realistic; it is distorted, although I hope that it will become an objective."

Real-estate operations have been concentrated in Marbella and its vicinity, an area which already has a mosque. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia is one of the principal protagonists of large-scale operations: when he was still a prince, he purchased the El Paraiso and El Marfil properties for 1 billion and 500 million pesetas, respectively; he built a palace on the latter property at a cost of approximately 2 billion pesetas. Not less noteworthy was the purchase made by the Midani group--the property of a Siero resident with Saudi passport--who became the owner of the tourist-apartment complexes Puente Romano and

Marbella Club, valued at about 4 billion pesetas. Meanwhile, financier Khashoggi has purchased land near Marbella for the sum of about 3.5 billion pesetas, and a company named Grand Estate--an Arab multinational of the Sambar enterprise group--has purchased parcels for 300 million pesetas with the objective of developing an urban complex involving an investment estimated at 3 billion. In addition, a Kuwaiti group has become the owner of the apartment complex known as Marbella Center which, until recently, was the property of Rumasa; the Mabani Company, located in France but controlled by Arab capital, has purchased part of the tourist-complex property known as Puerto Banus and, also on the Malaga coast, a Saudi group has taken over ownership of the real-estate complex, Puerto Cabopino.

8568
CSO: 3548/33

BUSINESS INSTITUTE FORESEES MODERATE ECONOMIC UPTURN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Nov 82 p 8

[Article by Jan Magnus Fahlstrom]

[Text] The economic situation in 1982 was much worse than expected. Overall, the Swedish economy will improve somewhat in 1983. Individual households must prepare themselves, however. Their income in fixed monetary values after taxes will drop by 2.6 percent next year, while corporate incomes will increase.

This is a brief summary of the report entitled "The Economic Situation: Fall 1982" written by the Institute for Economic Research (KI) which was published as a press release last Thursday.

GNP Rises

According to KI, the drop in private consumption in 1983 will not be quite as great as the drop in income--2 percent compared to 2.6 percent--which means that households will reduce their savings to maintain their level of consumption. Nevertheless, consumption will drop much more than this year and last year, when the decrease was 0.5 percent annually.

Despite this, the calculations indicate that the gross national product--the total value of all goods and services--will rise from minus 0.7 percent in 1981 to plus 0.1 percent this year and plus 1.8 percent in 1983.

This is because the devaluation of the krona in September 1981 has boosted exports, despite the bleak international economic situation. According to KI, Swedish exports have risen this year by 3 percent and within the OECD (the Western industrialized countries) they have increased by 3.5 percent.

Growth within the OECD market as a whole has been 0.5 percent, which means that the devaluation has helped Sweden increase its share of the market by 3 percent.

Increased Exports

The KI report stresses the effect that the most recent devaluation on 8 October will have and that its greatest effects will be felt in 1983 and later.

KI hopes that the devaluation will result in a significant improvement in the competitive strength of Swedish companies both at home and abroad.

In this way, the Swedish economy will receive a "strong boost" in the form of greatly increased exports and reduced imports. It is believed that the export volume will increase by 7.1 percent next year, while the increase in imports will be only 0.9 percent.

This assumes, however, that the two sides in the upcoming wage negotiations will be "well-behaved." KI also stressed that many uncertain assumptions were made, including assumptions concerning the economic policies whose details the government has not yet presented.

KI's employment predictions are bleak. Increased production cannot "prevent unemployment from remaining at the relatively high level reached during the second half of 1982." This means that unemployment will rise from 3.5 percent this year to 3.75 percent in 1983.

Another negative aspect of KI's predictions is that private investments will continue to drop at an ever increasing rate. In 1981 the drop was 4.1 percent, this year it is 4.7 percent, and next year it will be 7.7 percent.

9336
CSO: 3650/37

UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES CONFUSING, BUT IMPROVEMENT INDICATED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Nov 82 p 12

[Article by Bo A. Ericsson]

[Text] "This is too good to be true." This was the response at both the Labor Ministry and AMS (National Labor Market Board) to the new unemployment figures released on Monday by the Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB). These figures indicate that unemployment dropped in a single month by almost 50,000--from 176,000 in September to 127,000 in October (3 percent).

This is by far the largest reduction ever noted from one month to the next since the present system of statistics was introduced.

The difference between the SCB figures and the (somewhat different) AMS results is striking. According to AMS, 170,000 people lined up at employment offices in late September to seek work.

Labor Minister Anna-Greta Leijon told DAGENS NYHETER:

"These figures must be taken with a grain of salt. They are not supported by any other signs of improvement in the labor market. No break in the general trend has occurred. Occasionally, the figures for individual months are unreliable."

Uncertain Figures

Ake Dahlberg, division director at AMS, said:

"A certain drop in unemployment is common at this time of year, but this decrease seems to be too dramatic. It is based on a sample survey, however, and chance may have played a part. While the October figures are too low, we also believe that the September figures were too high. We wish SCB would make its monthly surveys more reliable."

Anita Olofson of SCB said:

"These statistics are based on a sampling. This means that the figures are

somewhat uncertain. It is clear, however, that unemployment has dropped since September."

AMS also came to this conclusion: This is not due to any increase in demand for personnel on the open labor market, however, but primarily to labor market policies initiated this fall, according to AMS.

This program was initiated by the nonsocialist government early this fall and has been continued by the Social Democratic government.

A total of 146,000 people now are employed in various AMS programs. This is 23,000 more than in September and 28,000 more than in October last year. These are people who otherwise would have been unemployed.

The number of relief jobs, for example, almost doubled from September to October to almost 44,000.

More AMS Jobs

These new relief jobs are seen as the primary reason for the decrease in unemployment among young people--from 61,000 in October last year to 48,000 at present (or 7.3 percent). Almost 29,000 of the 43,800 who had relief jobs in October were young people.

Thus, even though there has been a certain reduction in unemployment from September to October, it is believed that the reduction was not as great as that indicated by the SCB figures.

In addition, the total number of people remaining outside the regular labor market today is greater than at the same time last year.

In October, 459,000 people were without any job, were involved in AMS programs of some type, were forced to work part time, or believed it was hopeless to look for work.

9336
CSO: 3650/37

FINANCE MINISTER: EXPECT PURCHASING-POWER DROP OF FIVE PERCENT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Nov 82 p 1

[Text] Wage earners will have a difficult time in 1983. Their purchasing power will drop by at least 5 percent. At best, unemployment will remain at the record level of 170,000, according to the emergency plan proposed by the government last Wednesday. The budget deficit will rise by 15 billion to 90 billion kronor.

The increase in the budget deficit is due primarily to the fact that state-owned companies need at least 10 billion kronor to avoid bankruptcy and interest payments on government debts are rising drastically.

The only bright spots indicated by Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt are a slight increase in industrial production during 1983 and a somewhat lower decrease in industrial investments than predicted. The trade-balance deficit will continue to rise.

Property tax and inheritance tax will be increased.

Companies will be required to deposit 20 percent of their profits into no-interest accounts at the Bank of Sweden. These deposits will be tax deductible if a similar amount is used for investments.

It is doubtful that the government's profit-sharing proposal is sufficiently comprehensive to have a restraining effect on wage negotiations, according to LO (Federation of Trade Unions) chairman Gunnar Nilsson.

He believes, however, that the government's overall program could facilitate the wage negotiations.

Both the opposition and business turned thumbs down on the government's minibudget.

"The main problem is that they are trying to squeeze wage earners instead of the public sector," Liberal Party leader Ola Ullsten said.

9336
CSO: 3650/37

PAPER COMMENTS ON GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC PLAN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Nov 82 p 2

[Editorial by Nils-Eric Sandberg]

[Text] The government is about to lift Sweden out of the economic crisis, according to its campaign promises. The "economic strategy" is as follows: "The competitive strength of industry must be improved, profits must rise, investments must be stimulated, and private consumption dampeden." In addition, inflation will be held down.

That sounds fine. Why has no one thought of that before?

In concrete terms, the government will carry out this wise strategy as follows:

Increased subsidies and support for businesses will increase the budget deficit from 75 to about 90 billion kronor. This will help increase private consumption, the volume of money, and inflation. It will drive up interest rates and, thus, indirectly reduce investments.

Industrial investments are the decisive factor. The authors of the emergency proposal point out (as so many have previously) that we are producing "the wrong goods" and that industrial production must be given "a new direction."

There long has been both a theoretical and a statistical basis for demonstrating a relationship between profit levels and investments. On the one hand, the prospect of profits attracts investments and, on the other, investments are financed to a great extent with profits already received.

According to the "strategy," profits will be allowed to rise. In concrete terms, the government proposes to double the required deposit of profits (20 plus 20 percent) and a nondeductible "fee" of 20 percent on profits available for distribution. Thus, in practice, the proposal is designed to reduce profits at precisely the time when companies should invest more.

The emergency proposal is inconsistent--the various parts do not go together. Nothing in the proposal indicates that the economic reality, the investment process, the alternatives, or the effects have been analyzed.

In 1983, 40 percent of company profits will be deposited in Bank of Sweden accounts and in investment funds: the money may be used for "productive investments" after consultations with the local union.

How will this affect the net volume of investments? How many large companies make investment decisions for 1 year at a time? Not many. Investment decisions are not simply a matter of deciding to build a plant. The decision is preceded by market analyses, the choice of products and production methods, personnel training, choice of machinery, etc. Expanding companies must work with investment programs involving several years. They cannot begin new construction simply because the government ties up some of their profits for a year in a special account.

It is possible that these deposits may lead to a certain number of new investments that otherwise would not have been made. But the relevant questions--which the proposal does not ask--are how many investments the deposits will prevent and in what branches of industry investments will increase or decrease. The authors of the proposal seem to have no idea what the net result will be--nor do they seem to care.

The special 20-percent tax on dividends will not be deductible. This means that tax will be paid from profits that already have been taxed by about 57 percent. Thus, a large portion of the companies' very small profits (compared to their competitors) will be taken away by the new tax.

The government seems to view profits as a kind of excess money with no meaning that can be taken in as taxes with no other effects. The government needs the money most. After all, it has so many campaign promises to keep.

Profits from older rental properties and power plants will be recovered by a special tax. Because of the present high inflation rate, new housing and power plants often show a loss--which usually is financed by profits from older facilities on which the mortgage payments already have been made. Profits from older projects may be a prerequisite for new investments. There is not one word in the proposal about this function of profits.

Investments in industry are to be directed toward new goods and new areas. Directed by whom? In a free-market economy, profits are the most important control mechanism. Investments (and production, growth, and real wages) were kept up during the fifties and sixties by allocations based on profit. At that time, there were no wage-earner funds and everything went well.

If investments are not guided by the prospect of profits, they must be controlled by negotiations or by dictate. We know which companies have been favored by this type of control. They are the companies within Statsforetag and Svenska Varv.

Corporate profits and dividends are extremely low. After taxes they amount to a few percent or per mille (if that much) of the GNP and disposable incomes. Nevertheless, those profits serve an important control function that is

difficult to replace. Now the government is eliminating this function, leaving industry "without a paddle."

Now 85 to 90 percent of dividends will be swallowed up by taxes. The government seems to believe that the country's economic problems came about because this figure is too low.

9336
CSO: 3650/37

Saab presents first new passenger plane in a generation

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Oct 82 p 36

[Article by Lars Dahl]

[Text] Linkoping, Wednesday--A completely new order for three more airplanes and an equally new finance company were what Saab Scania and the American firm of Fairchild Industries were able to produce on Wednesday.

The two companies presented the news at a large and well-staged show at which they displayed a completely assembled Saab-Fairchild 340 passenger plane, or SF-340, as it is also called. It is a plane designed primarily for regional or feeder traffic.

This means that thanks to the three planes just ordered by Trans Colorado, an American regional airline, Saab Scania's order book is starting to show some life again after being dormant for quite some time.

The new finance company will be used to help customers finance their purchases and is a step being taken to keep ahead of competitors who manufacture planes in the same category and are fighting for the same market. More often than not, it is precisely the financing that has been the deciding factor when a customer has been faced with a choice. The new finance company is registered in the United States and cooperates with an unnamed American bank.

Saab Scania and Fairchild are both decidedly optimistic about the future. It is true that the recession has slowed new orders to some extent, but the companies still feel that the time is right. In all, they now have approximately 100 orders, divided about equally between the American and European markets. Except for the three planes just ordered by Trans Colorado, that figure has remained the same for the past year and even decreased as a result of the cancellation of an order for nine planes not so long ago.

Saab Scania says: "We have no experience in this, but according to other civil aircraft manufacturers, that is entirely normal. There are many presumptive customers who are in no hurry because they do not need to replace their fleets just now."

"In any case, we will have our hands full for the next few years with the orders we have now."

JAS Issue Settled

At the moment, however, negotiations are underway for a total of 30 planes. And the companies will be in a new and better selling position in January 1983, when the SF-340 takes to the air and shows what it can do. There may be a new boost when the plane is exhibited at the big air show in Paris next summer.

Dr Tore Gullstrand, head of Saab Scania's Aircraft Division, pointed out: "The civil project has also picked up strength now that the issue of the JAS military plane has been settled as far as Saab Scania is concerned."

Before teaming up, both Saab Scania and Fairchild had conducted marketing studies showing that there will be a worldwide market for about 2,000 planes in the SF-340 category between now and the year 2000. Saab Scania and its partner think they can capture between 25 and 30 percent of that market--that is, between 500 and 600 planes.

Jan Hull, Swedish marketing chief for the airplane, said: "There is competition, but we now have twice as many planes on order as all our competitors combined."

Both companies also feel that with the new plane, they have a big possibility of going a long way as suppliers to firms that need their own aircraft. This includes firms for which jet planes are starting to become too expensive. Of the approximately 100 orders currently on hand, a good 20 are from the business world, chiefly in the United States.

So it is a first-rate plane that has been produced. This was emphasized in all the speeches delivered during the show and at the press conference.

One of the main weapons being counted on by Saab-Fairchild is the fact that the plane is obviously fuel-efficient--an important selling point at a time when airlines are seeing their fuel costs constantly on the rise.

If the big venture is to pay its way, Saab-Fairchild will have to sell about 200 aircraft. At that point, they will have gotten back the money invested in development and production--a total of \$760 million in 1980 dollars. That amount is being shared by the two companies more or less equally.

Signature

Incidentally, Saab-Fairchild is not satisfied with the SF-340 it is working with now. Its plans already include the possibility of lengthening the plane to carry from 45 to 50 passengers instead of the present 34. And a small group of people are already occupied with other ideas for civil aircraft that may become a reality in the 1990's.

Wednesday was undeniably a big day for Saab Scania and its partner Fairchild. It has been 36 years since Saab Scania last presented a commercial aircraft. That plane was called the Saab Scandia, and the only one left today is in a museum in Brazil.

The big show was on Wednesday. The exhibit, following the American pattern known as the "roll out," was also American in its organization, although it was moderately flavored with a little Swedish starchiness and formality.

There were 500 guests, champagne, many speeches, King Carl Gustaf, and the "Royal Song." The king pressed a button, the lights went out, and a curtain rose slowly to reveal the object, which was painted with the insignia of two airlines that had ordered the plane: Crossair of Switzerland and Air Midwest of the United States. A little later, the plane was also provided with the royal signature on its nose.

11798
CSO: 3650/29

ECONOMIC UPTURN NOT EXPECTED UNTIL LATE 1983

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 5 Nov 82 p 13

[Article by "G. S." on Swiss economic trends: "The Cool Economic Climate Continues--Recovery Not Expected Until Second Half of 1983"]

[Text] While the interest euphoria which has caused a flare in the desire for investment on the international financial markets in the past few weeks is an expression and sign of hope of improvement to come, it is but a small segment of the big picture of economic data, creating a distorted positive impression. So, in fact, the assessment of the Swiss economic situation by the various research institutes, banks and firms continues to be guarded. Indeed the predicted upturn is being put off until even later in 1983 than was the case in the spring. Yet there is unanimity about the fact that a recovery is bound to occur and is going to occur. This expected upturn has not developed any kind of shape, however. Rather there is every indication that it will consist of a large number of comparatively small changes in the individual components of the gross domestic product (GDP) and will not assume a characteristic nature as the result of a boom in consumption, exports or investments. This means that the "recovery" (in all, in the opinion of most forecasters, there will be a slightly negative growth rate of the GDP even in 1983) is anything but certain, for the predicted slight improvements in the individual component sectors are so close to zero that, in light of the customary lack of accuracy of forecasts, the trend easily might turn into the opposite.

Before a Seasonal Decrease in Employment

Past data are more distinct, and in fact the figures for the second quarter and the past few months show some unambiguous trends. The current economic development is clearly dominated by an increase in unemployment. No wonder this subject according to opinion polls, at present is more on the minds of Swiss than any other. The low in this trend is hardly likely to have been reached as yet. Business in any case expects further decreases in employment, and if one keeps in mind that the winter with its seasonally caused "gap" is still to come, it stands to reason that the September figures (13,638 unemployed and about 40,000 partly unemployed) will yet be exceeded. A total of 30,000 completely unemployed, or about 1 percent of the active population, is variously mentioned as an entirely realistic prospect. Continuing increasing employment in the service sector will no longer suffice to offset the reduction in the secondary sector. Nevertheless, as the Executive Federal Council stated in its assessment of the

economic situation later in September, conditions such as prevailed in 1976 are not to be expected. This is also documented by the total of nonproductive hours due to partial unemployment, which amounted to 1.4 million in September 1982 whereas in the last quarter of 1975, for instance, it was more than 4 million a month on the average.

A not only quantitative but almost qualitative change in the statistical picture was caused by the fact that the number of gainfully employed persons in the second quarter--down by 1 percent to 3,101,000--was again lower for the first time in a long time. The creation of jobs thus was smaller than their "abolition." This trend appears to take a significance because it reveals a general economic trend which, everything else being equal, is not steering toward a balance with full employment. It is therefore likely that the call for a shortening of work-time, which has been voiced in part in a fairly undifferentiated manner, will become even louder. It should be pointed out, however, that the decrease in employed is not equivalent to the increase in the number of unemployed in that the gainful employment quota and the potential of gainfully employed personnel can change, with foreign workers also making thier contribution.

Weakness in Investments Despite Interest Impulses

At least as strongly as in employment figures, the current recession is making itself felt in industrial production. After the reduction in the first quarter, a slight improvement in the original values (an increase from 143 to 151 points occurred in the second quarter of 1982, but in the view of the Economic Research Office of the Swiss Technical College (KOF), it probably did not persist in the third quarter. Except in the food and luxury food industry, the graphic trade, the machine industry and the leather, rubber and plastics industry, the index in addition was in part quite clearly below the previous year's figures as early as in the second quarter of 1982, and after the data are adjusted to allow for seasonal differences they make it quite clear it is a question of stagnation rather than stabilizaiton.

In all, the GDP, depending on the particular estimate, amounted to a little less or a little more than the year before. Not least it will depend on investment activity whether by late next year the GDP will be about 2 percent below that of 1981, as is predicted fairly unanimously by the BAK [Federal Credit System Supervisory Authority] (1982: -0.9 percent; 1983: -1.3 percent) and the KOF (1982: -1.8 percent; 1983: +0.3 percent). As far as interest rates are concerned, there appear to be definite grounds for a certain optimism. Except for a brief temporary high in June, interest rates for 3-month Eurofrancs are continuing their march downward, begun already in the first quarter, in the second quarter and in the summer months, and the trend continues to point in that direction. Simultaneously with the general downward trend, short-term interest rates also dropped below the level of the lazier long-term rates. However, the assertion that low interests caused lively investment activity is not much more than textbook wisdom.

What is more crucial is expectations, and these--despite the fall in interest rates--are marked by uncertainty over future developments on the financial

markets and by a still quite pessimistic assessment of what is in store in the way of profits and sales. Receipts of orders did go down about 8 percent in the second quarter. In industries connected with building and in capital goods industries, business slackened even more. In the metal and machine industry, orders decreased as much as 15 percent. Work reserve is now only 6.2 months, 14 percent lower than end of June 1981.

In light of this, investment developments in the third quarter have to be evaluated as remarkably strong. According to a Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft poll, anyway, about one-quarter of the companies have invested more, and one-quarter have invested less. If the voiced business intentions are realized, this will undergo some change in the fourth quarter since, despite the effected production curtailments, inventories continue to be classified as too high. Despite falling imports in investment goods, equipment goods investments for the purpose of rationalization are more likely to be adhered to than building investments. The number of industrial projects for new construction and expansion, anyway, was 26.3 percent below the previous year's figure as early as in the third quarter, which means that the planned area volume may amount to 7.6 percent less.

Crucial Foreign Demand

Whereas private consumption has been the pillar of economic trends for a long time, the situation has changed in 1982. Though the decrease in available household income is not drastic, the consumers' mood has worsened. And indeed real retail trade sales have been declining for months, and in the third quarter were 1.9 percent below those of the year before. (In the second quarter they had been 1.3 percent lower). Particularly evident is the drop in clothing and foodstuffs and --in the services sector--in Swiss tourists' overnight stays, which in the second quarter dropped to a point which on an annual basis would amount to a minus of almost 20 percent. According to most forecasts, private consumption will not change substantially--and, if it does, only for the worse. But despite no appreciable change in consumption by individual households, the drop in foreign workers likely to result from the labor market situation and a further drop in tourism might lead to a somewhat greater decrease. Moreover a cost-of-living compensation is unlikely to be granted everywhere to the extent certified by the false consumer price index, so that no impulses are to be expected from the income side.

The situation in public consumption, on the other hand, is a little different. here not least owing to final balances of the Federal Government, cantons and municipalities, which are rather higher than expected) there is a general anticipation of positive growth rates--a little higher ones in the current year and a little lower ones in the coming year. Despite the fact that the share in the GDP is substantially smaller than that of private consumption, in the case of the public sector, if anywhere, it is therefore possible to speak of a certain supporting function. Over the longer term, this is, however, subject to question because forces of regeneration in the economy can be awakened rather by relief from government burdens than by additional taking of households and companies--the latter happening to be the reverse side of the model of growth of public consumption and investment demand.

The least problematical contribution to an upswing could and should therefore unquestionably come from foreign demand. This statement is bound to be surprising in light of the drop in tourism and exports this summer, with exports in real terms 10 percent lower, and in nominal terms 6.6 percent lower than in the third quarter of 1981. This setback was so great that it resulted in a drop of 2.5 percent (in real terms) in the first 9 months. Nowhere, however, is the conditional character of forecasts as clear as in the foreign economic sector. The fact that the franc at present is weak vis-a-vis the dollar and more or less balanced vis-a-vis the deutsche mark should make itself felt in a certain revival of orders and, with due delay, of sales.

(In September the real, export-weighted franc exchange rate index was 104--that is, only 2.8 percent above the rate of the previous year and about 5.5 percent below this year's maximum rate of 110 in March.) The fact that the pressure on the margins in exports almost ceased to increase in the second quarter, in the opinion of the commission for economic trends, may point in that direction. If, however, the real exchange rate should make some leaps or other or if the economic situation should not improve to the desired extent, this impulse, the only one to be expected at present, would not take effect either. And, sure enough, as regards assessment of export trends--as well as changes in inventories--the optimistic KOF and the rather pessimistic BAK are divided.

Slow Progress on the Inflation Front

Another prerequisite for recovery is an absolutely, and in comparison with abroad relatively, low rate of inflation. If the, in comparison with abroad, rather tight Swiss monetary policy should continue--and there is every indication that is will--it is likely that the franc will again show a higher trend on the foreign currency markets, but the difference in inflation in comparison with abroad then really ought to develop favorably. With the current strengthening of liquidity, the National bank continues to pursue the aim it has set itself not to expand the adjusted central bank circulation by more than 3 percent on a yearly average. By having kept the increase below the possible maximum for this length of time, it is now even having a slightly expansive effect, without jeopardizing monetary policy stability. Though the rate of inflation, with 5.5 percent (in September) is anything but low, one has to describe the present price situation as less overheated than 12 months ago, when it still amounted to an annual 7.5 percent.

Nevertheless the fight against inflation unjustifiably has lost its top spot on the list of priorities in public opinion; for low interest rates and a revival of the international economy are not enough to cause an economic upswing again. A lower rate of inflation on the other hand, raises the price competitiveness of Swiss companies, having a positive effect on real income of households, and thus domestic consumption. From this point of view, the fight against inflation probably continues to be at the same time the best way to insure jobs.

8790
CSO: 3620/72

WAVE OF YOUTH PROTESTS WORRIES DANES AS DISORDERS INCREASE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Oct 82 p 18

[Article by Ake Ringberg]

[Text] Copenhagen--Danish squatters and unemployed young people are now being served champagne and invited to write cultural articles in the established national press.

And if they are not offered champagne, they go into Copenhagen's finest restaurants and help themselves--without interference, in most cases, from the police.

Despite that, the Danish youth revolt is being taken increasingly seriously. The newspaper POLITIKEN opened its columns on Wednesday to the young activists who, 24 hours earlier, had stormed into a champagne reception at the newspaper's offices for 70-year-old journalist Harald Mogensen.

Just as editor-in-chief Herbert Pundik was getting ready to tap his champagne glass for the guest of honor, the 200 stormed into the room with loud shouts for food, after which they grabbed the food right from under the noses of the guests.

Pundik, who has been under worse fire and who knows a good deal about the problematics of the squatters, decided that a delaying defense was the best tactic to use against the young people. They wanted their demands for jobs and housing to appear on POLITIKEN's first page.

A few nights ago, they had been denied permission to have their demands printed in the conservative BERLINGSKE TIDENDE--known as "Auntie"--but the editor-in-chief of the competing newspaper said that if the young people were given a chance, circulation was not likely to suffer because of it.

"Brats"

Before the decision was reached and Pundik gave in, the vocal pitch had risen, and the editor-in-chief was heard to shout: "You are damn well brats, but get together now and pick out three or four who can write a "Commentary" column for POLITIKEN."

At the same time, cultural editor Niels Barfoed was seen promising the young people in a whisper that there would be a summary on the first page, after which the young people left.

On Wednesday morning, the result could be seen in POLITIKEN's "Commentary" column. Under the headline "Action Now--or Die of Starvation Tomorrow," the activists introduced themselves. They said: "The storming of POLITIKEN was only a foretaste of what we intend to do from now on--just wait."

The article also said: "We are unemployed apprentices, young unemployed squatters, candidates for an education, and young people living on the starvation circular (the usual name for the government's austerity program)--in short, we are young people in Copenhagen who know all about the severe housing shortage, the lack of money, unemployment, inadequate pay, poor opportunities for work and leisure, and so on."

It was claimed that the crisis policy that various Danish governments have been pursuing for the past 8 years has been a "campaign of cutbacks" for workers and the unemployed. How do the unemployed go on strike? How does one get food without money?

It was pointed out that Danes outside the government unemployment benefit programs (which currently pay 90 percent of one's wages, a figure that is going to be cut to 85 percent) are given 1,700 kroner per month to live on. This involves mainly young people under 18 years of age.

Food Raids

In their column, the activists let it be known that what they have done so far in the way of occupying buildings, making symbolic entrances in luxurious restaurants, and so on are only a rehearsal for a nationwide day of action being planned for 11 November.

In the meantime, they will continue their raids on department stores, where they go into the grocery departments and help themselves, on restaurants and nonsocialist newspapers, and on workplaces, where they try to extort more openings for apprentices and trainees.

The wave of protest by young people in Denmark naturally has a direct link with the acute unemployment level, which is increasing steadily (270,000 at present and at least 30,000 more next year), and with Denmark's gigantic foreign debt, which must be paid if the country is to avoid bankruptcy.

One leader of a cooperative construction company describes the situation in the Copenhagen housing market as the worst since the war. A recent survey shows that there are 10,000 vacant apartments in Greater Copenhagen, most of them out in the dreary suburbs, while at the same time, there are somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 people looking for housing.

"Spineless"

There are differing opinions as to where the youth revolt is heading, just as there are divided views on how serious the revolt is. A psychologist at Copenhagen University says it is quite admirable that there are people who refuse to adjust. He sees the young people's ideals as reminiscent of those of Rousseau and the French Revolution.

Author Ulla Dahlerup, on the other hand, feels that the young people are "spineless, paralyzed in action, and incapable of revolt." She says:

"We are not doing young people a service by feeling sorry for them. We will do them a service by giving them a kick in the rear and telling them: 'Wake up and take responsibility for your own lives.'

"Young people have more money than we ever had, but they use that money in a destructive way."

That is not likely to be of any consolation to the jobseeking Danish young people, whose revolt may be only a beginning.

11798
CSO: 3650/29

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

HESSE GREENS SET TERMS FOR COOPERATION WITH SPD

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURT ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Nov 82 p 4

[Text] Gross-Gerau, 21 Oct--Hesse's Greens, in their talks with Social Democrats on cooperation in the Land parliament in Wiesbaden, want "no compromises on questions of life and survival." As they decided with a clear majority during a 2-day Land meeting over the weekend in Gross-Gerau, for them the prerequisite for continued cooperation and thus also for the election of an SPD prime minister is that Hesse become a zone free of atomic, biological and chemical weapons, that all nuclear energy installations be closed, that the west runway be reforested and that highway construction be stopped. Independent of the realization of these demands, they are prepared for specific cooperation in parliament in areas where there is agreement with the SPD. With this decision in the first Land meeting following the elections, Hesse's Greens have continued their previous essentially uncompromising position--mainly out of the fear of losing their "credibility and identity" if they abandon their course.

In the discussion of the question of cooperation with the SPD, the Greens' doubts about whether the SPD is really interested in cooperation were apparent. They accused the SPD of using the planned talks only to demonstrate that the Greens are not capable of having a constructive policy. Many Greens believe that the SPD only wants to gather "plus points for early new elections." Accordingly, the result of the talks is predetermined: In the view of the SPD the Greens are responsible for any failure of talks. The Greens see this view demonstrated by the experiences in Hamburg, which, as reported by two representatives of the Greens in Gross-Gerau, had shown that the SPD is practicing an "embrace as a tactic."

In the discussion the Greens drew various conclusions from this widely held view. Some were of the opinion that they should not depart "1 inch" from their own demands and that they should use the talks to make their own objectives known among the population; accordingly, the Greens' political course is not directed to the SPD, but to the population of Hesse. This position was opposed by those who considered it utopian to believe that all Hesse would discuss the Greens' program for Hesse.

Others among the Greens saw the results of the elections in Hesse as a mandate by the voters to be sufficiently prepared to compromise so as to put through at least some demands with the help of the SPD. The voters have been promised: Election day is payday. These voters now had a right to demand that something be achieved politically. The Greens needed successes.

Even those who called for more willingness to compromise had to admit that the chances of putting through the Greens' policies were not great. A Green from Kassel, in whose home community red and green cooperation is practiced, was of the opinion that cooperation between Greens and SPD in Kassel was largely a failure, the policies being hindered by the executive branch in particular.

A beginning Land parliament delegate advised learning to take small steps. "We are now engaged in parliamentary work. We are no longer the same as we were before 26 September," he said. He was strongly contradicted by those feeling that the Greens still have an obligation to their goals, which do not allow compromises in vital questions.

9746
CSO: 3620/69

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN HESSE SPD, GREENS REPORTED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 1 Nov 82 pp 31-32

[Text] In Salzburg Land Social Democrat Holger Boerner thought about his relations with the new social movements. When he wanted "to see some green," said the Hesse prime minister later, "I went into the forest." When he came out again everything was a little different.

Having returned to Wiesbaden after a 10-day vacation, there was no more talk of anti-parliamentarians, who "remind one of fascists," or violent demonstrators, for whom a board might be the best remedy. He has "absolutely no fear of contact" with the Greens, said the government head suddenly, and among them he knows "a number of thoughtful young people, not just troublemakers."

In the Hesse Land parliament, where conditions like those in Hamburg have prevailed since 26 September (distribution of seats: CDU 52, SPD 49, Greens 9), the parliamentary newcomers took that as "the sound of a flute" signaling a 180-degree change of course--the evening after elections the government head was still announcing that there can be "no talks" with the Greens.

Boerner's moderate words were the reaction to pressure within the party. For even party members who have always been loyal to the chairman condemned the earlier statements as "a tune that one is better advised to avoid," as put by a member of the Land executive board. The party members would find such words by Boerner as extremely disturbing now that they want to enter into discussions with the Greens after all.

For in Hesse the climate between Social Democrats and Greens has experienced a surprising improvement. Now for the debutants in the Land parliament Boerner is no longer equivalent to Dregger. In turn, the SPD, with Boerner's approval, quickly accepted an offer by the Greens to publicly speak with one another on possible cooperation. "Such a thing was unimaginable just recently," says SPD Land parliament delegate Udo Schlitzberger with astonishment.

Last week a delegation of Hesse Social Democrats made a quick trip to Hamburg to ask party members there about their experiences with the parliamentary newcomers. The impressions, reported a participant, "were encouraging, those people are not just dropouts and hippies," whom the Hamburg Social Democrats faced. Last weekend the Land executive board of the Hesse SPD decided to talk with the Greens even before the start of the new legislative period on 1 December.

Chosen as negotiators by the executive board were Paul Leo Giani, Land party director and chief thinker, and Horst Winterstein, chairman of the parliamentary group, who has learned to talk with the Greens in his election district Main-South Taunus. Unlike Hamburg, where Mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi negotiated with the Greens himself, in Hesse the government head will not be present. Boerner was "happy that he was not even asked," as one of his advisers put it.

Hesse party members are also not counting on being able to win over the Greens as majority-makers in the foreseen election of new prime minister during the constituent session of the new Land parliament on 1 December. Under these circumstances Boerner considered not putting himself up for election immediately.

That is what Walter Wallman, designated CDU Land chairman, is now resolved to do. Last week Frankfurt's chief mayor announced his candidacy for the office of prime minister--likewise a hopeless endeavor.

For his election Wallman, who as a result of Alfred Dregger's spontaneous withdrawal was pushed into the role of Hesse CDU leader more quickly than he wished, needs four votes from the SPD or from the Greens, who immediately dismissed his undertaking as a "seditious advance" and an "affront to the parliamentary system."

The Hesse CDU presents Wallman primarily to show that it, as the strongest party, has "a mandate for leadership from the voters" and new elections are "urgently necessary because Boerner's remaining cabinet is unable to act."

The Boerner government, which according to the Hesse constitution must step down at the end of the legislative period, could remain until a new prime minister is elected into office, but with very restricted powers. It could perform "on-going business" only, could not, for example, decide on the construction of a school.

It is about this phase and the time following it that party members are thinking. They are now preparing for a round of talks with the Greens, similar to those (unsuccessful) in Hamburg. And both Hesse Social Democrat wings expect something to come out of it.

The SPD's leftwing grouping wants to "sound out all possibilities," according to a member of the executive board. In the long run the party's leftwing sees an opportunity to do business with the Greens, even with a new prime minister. To be sure, the parliamentary group is almost solidly behind Boerner, but after the withdrawal of Helmut Schmidt party members in Hesse too no longer want to exclude the possibility that the "chubby one" should voluntarily step aside in the near future.

Rightwing Social Democrats are mainly interested in "exhibiting" the debutants, as one Social Democrat delegate sees it: "Know nothing about a proper budget, but bicker." In the case of new elections, so goes the concept, that should take votes back from the Greens and give them to the SPD.

The SPD members have already hinted that they could cooperate with the Greens. Now that Boerner no longer has to consider the FDP, his support of the Hesse atomic projects is more reserved. The Social Democrat is no longer so sure

about the necessity of a third reactor block in Biblis, and in this regard he sees himself "deceived by the energy sector."

And the burden of possibly allowing the construction of a reprocessing installation in Frankenberg-Wangershausen in North Hesse is no longer so heavy now that Schwandorf in Bavaria has moved into the foreground as a possible site; last week the German Society for Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel asked the Bavarian Government to begin the legal approval procedure.

The most difficult item in negotiations between the SPD and the new force could well be the third runway at the Frankfurt airport. SPD members agree that the runway will stay, especially since in the meantime the concrete has already been poured.

Whether there are chances for agreement in particular areas or for some sort of alliance, the Social Democrats also demand adherence to the rules of the game. The SPD expects from the Greens, so reads a decision by the Land executive board, "clear declarations on their relationship to the rules of parliamentary democracy and on their position in regard to the use of force as a means for settling political differences."

The newcomers to the Land parliament will have their difficulties. Following the thrust by the Social Democrats they are obviously struggling with considerable perplexity, even before taking up parliamentary work in Wiesbaden.

For the impending talks, the public nature of which they themselves have demanded, the Greens lack personalities who would be an immediate match for the political professionals. An SPD Land parliament delegate could find among them "at most two or three experienced people." The others are "naive idealists who themselves are sitting around and must first learn how to read official documents and prepare a budget."

Unlike the situation in Hamburg or Berlin, for example, where former strategists of the far Left have united with ecologists and alternative groups, for the most part the Hesse Greens have remained green. With their inflexible principle of "fundamental opposition" the new parliamentarians are probably blocking themselves. They have committed themselves to enter into possible agreements with the SPD in particular subjects only. In the case of all discrepancies they must first come to an understanding with the basis, with the influential group of the runway opponents, for example.

At Land meetings it is "chaotic," as Greens themselves admit, and at times, such as on Friday of last week, a press conference by the Land parliament group has to be cancelled on short notice, because "we are still not in agreement, and have to get ourselves back in line," the excuse of group member Jochen Vielhaue.

Alternative and spontaneous groups from Frankfurt have resolved to break this "Hesse line" of basic opposition by the Greens. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, one of the leaders of the student movement at the end of the 1960's, calls for the Greens in Hesse to wake up from their "sleepy cleverness" and accept the change for a "qualitatively new policy."

In a motion before the Land party congress Cohn-Bendit and his co-combattant from the student revolt, Joschka Fischer, defined the nature of this "real policy." One should, states the demand by the influential Frankfurt group, offer "the Social Democrats negotiations with the goal of making possible a minority government capable of action."

For the election of the prime minister the Greens could only think of the gag of putting up their own candidate to oppose CDU candidate Wallmann. He is Alexander Schubart, former leftwing member of the Frankfurt SPD and now on trial for his runway activities.

9746
CSO: 3620/69

LEADERS FROM DEFUNCT LIBERAL PARTY SEE GREEN MOVEMENT FUTURE

Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 31 Oct 82 p 15

[Article by Tom Vuori and Stefan Lundberg]

[Text] "Our problem is credibility...We must be perceived as a serious alternative...Our platform must appeal to the enormous liberal potential among Finnish voters...We know that one of four voters think approximately the way we do...Now we must make them realize we think approximately the way the do...A few thousand to begin with...To get into Parliament...Later, the momentum will accelerate...", according to Seppo Westerlund.

For nonpoisonous potatoes, against nuclear energy. For a healthy, new way of thinking, against fossilized political cadres. Against capitalism, but not for socialism. For changes, but not against the system. Against change for the sake of change. For everything good. Against as little as possible. For a gentler society and nicer people. For us.

Is it possible to run on such a platform? "Certainly," is the answer today within the new "green" movement, vying for support in the upcoming parliamentary election. And not only to run for election, but all the way into Parliament. They figure on capturing at least one parliamentary seat--to start with.

The "green" movement--officially, "edistysliitto"--emerged from the ruins of the now-defunct Liberal People's Party. Half of the movement's executive committee members are Liberals, who refused to go along with the Center Party's coercive marriage tactics. The other half consists of anything from disillusioned Stalinists on the one hand to conscientious Conservative Party objectors on the other, who all have one thing in common--the conviction that the "old" parties' political differences are artificial and destructive and the will to defend the new basic values, which are being trampled upon by a changeable world.

Edistysliitto is not a party and the "green" movement candidates will appear on Swedish People's Party election lists in the parliamentary election next March. The Swedish People's Party's (SFP's) conditions for including "green" candidates on its lists are that former Liberals register with SFP and that the movement not enter more than two candidates in Helsinki and Nyland.

Obviously, the Swedish People's Party is coolly calculating that the "greens" will not do well enough to be elected to Parliament and, consequently, all their votes will automatically benefit SFP.

And, if contrary to expectations the "greens" do well, the cooperation would even be lucrative long term; Finnish-speaking candidates within the ranks of SFP would be an excellent way of getting irresolute sympathizers on the other side of the language barrier to step out and start voting Swedish. After all, the "greens" cannot live forever.

The old Liberals are hardly disturbed by the fact that SFP may be speculating on such a political fiasco for the "greens." They reason that even if they do not get elected, the SFP is the best alternative in any case and the best suitable heir to the old Liberal votes, better than the Center Party anyway.

The big problem for the "greens" at this time is the nomination of candidates. The names are supposed to be confirmed today, but the movement has not been able to engage any "sure" politicians with a guaranteed ability to win.

The strongest card so far is nurse and peace champion Eila Aro, who is now making a name for herself in local politics in Esbo. But with 1,400 votes in the last parliamentary election, Eila Aro still has a long way to go and, considering the limited campaign funds available to Edistysliitto with 150 paying members, many outside the movement are skeptical about her chances. However, here too the "greens" are counting on some help from SFP--which might kindly consider letting Mrs Aro use SFP radio and TV-debate quotas in Finnish.

Edistysliitto's second candidate in Nyland is "green" in a dual sense--he is pedagogue and handicap specialist Leena Erkilla, who has never before tested his political power.

In Helsinki the "greens" will probably run economist and handball player Kainu Mikkola, an active public figure and chairman of Pro Eira.

Another frequently mentioned name is student politician Juhani Parkkari.

Two other possible candidates who Seppo Westerlund, the powerful force behind Edistysliitto, (but who is not running), has been eying for a long time are former Minister of Justice Paavo Nikula and alternative politician Ville Komsu, Helsinki town councilor. However, both are rather reluctant and will probably react coolly to the invitation.

"I am fundamentally suspicious of all parties and party-like coalitions," Ville Komsu told HUFVUDSTADSBLADET. "I do not want to commit myself so it will probably be 'no.'"

Legal consultant Paavo Nikula would be worth gold to Edistysliitto; should he decide to fly the "green" flag, Nikula with his authority would immediately make the cause seem more serious and disperse many undecided observers' doubts about the movement.

"If Paavo decides to run for us, the rest will follow like rolling coins from a one-armed bandit having just hit the jackpot," Seppo Westerlund is supposed to have said.

The trouble is that Nikula himself is doubtful. He is perfectly satisfied with his "inside job and tolerable bosses" and too particular about his reputation as a discerning man to set out on any adventure.

And he does not know much about edistysliitto.

"In general, 'green' movements have made it a little too easy for themselves. To just say 'no' and be against everything may be acceptable for awhile, but 'what about later?' You cannot be in politics without a decent program."

"In defense of edistysliitto it must be said that, to the extent it is possible, the movement is trying to avoid the most dangerous pitfalls and that its members have perceived an important point, i.e., how the 'old' parties have terminated all contact with voters and how common people have lost all their influence."

Seppo Westerlund is now working overtime to show that the "greens" in Finland definitely do not intend to be a "no" front, but rather a new political force to be reckoned with, also when it comes to assuming responsibility and making decisions.

"One problem, of course, is that we--in order to be seen and known--must be a little extra controversial, thus running the risk of committing ourselves too much and getting stuck. But we shall guard against that. Anyway, unlike the West Germans, we will not embark on an entirely uncompromising course."

There is absolutely no doubt that edistysliitto is a different kind of political movement. Even the association's statutes absolutely border what the law allows for a registered association.

Personality cult and profiling are deadly sins within the movement, and the chairmanship is being rotated among its leaders. There are no secret meetings; press agents, for example, can be present even when the inner circle meets.

And to prevent once elected parliamentary representatives from "working harder to retain their seats than to accomplish something while in office," the movement has determined that none of their representatives can be a candidate more than twice in a row.

There is no doubt within the movement that the "greens" will elect at least one representative in the next election. They snort at the opinion polls' marginal results for Liberals and feel that now--when a real alternative is being offered--all of the old supporters and many more can be mobilized again.

Other studies, like one conducted by UUSI SUOMI, also show that one of four Finns would vote for an environment party if there were one. And now there is one.

If the "greens" can interest Eila Aro, or someone else, it means the end of edistysliitto and the beginning of a real party.

And if not?

"Then we will continue in good humor and set our sights on local elections," said Seppo Westerlund. "And we will be back."

Liberalism Lives--Party Dies

Party chairman Jaakko Itala, who had the questionable honor of leading his party into a merger with the Center Party, tried to outline the party's profile as late as at the end of the seventies. At that time, the Liberals seriously tried to run as the party of the middle class, Merkonomerna's party.

The attempt failed. Naturally, you might say later. The middle class had become a somewhat ugly and contemptible concept, which nobody, least of all the middle class, wanted to identify with.

The Liberal People's Party (LKP) thought the support would be somewhere between the Social Democrats and the Conservative Party. That should have been the case, but it was not.

"The party had no profile," said professor Jaakko Nousiainen.

"Liberalism as such had become the property of everybody; there was nothing special about it that might appeal to voters."

"All nonsocialist parties had long ago appropriated the Liberal ideals. Both the Right and the Left had certain ideals too on which to run."

According to Nousiainen, the Conservative Party, besides its traditional ideals, also has patriotism, the Church, etc., and has been successful in renewing itself and appealing to today's voters.

"Liberalism is the evolved person's ideology," said Nousiainen.

The problem with the idea of getting mass support for it is that it is too abstract and lacks palpability, the kind of palpability it had in the last century, especially in Central Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world, when liberalism was used to fight for democratic ideas against a conservative outlook.

"Most of liberalism's demands have now been met," according to Nousiainen.

Furthermore, liberalism in Finland has always had a special aspect, which made it different from that on the continent; its ideas here were always closer to the Right than the Left.

It did not seem hard to promote liberalism, only in Finland. This entire century, however, the liberals have fought opposition, thanks to increased welfare. This has been particularly true in England.

"Liberalism still lives," declared party chairman Jaakko Itala, when his bankrupt party merged with the Center Party. He might have added: "But the party is dying."

For example, the party will not be allowed to participate in the big television debate during the upcoming election campaign. Only the Center Party will be invited. Some time ago, the Minister of Justice ruled that the Liberal and Center parties can only be viewed as one and the same party in the upcoming parliamentary election.

The parties' candidates must appear on a joint list and the number of candidates presented for the two will be the same as for one of the other parties.

The ideological motives for the merger of the Liberal and Center parties sounded hollow from the very beginning. The real motive for the merger was disclosed later when the Liberal People's Party's million mark deals were made public.

According to the opinion of many, should the Liberals who remained in the party still have an ideological motive, it would be the issue of trying to stop voters' flight to the Conservative Party.

The goal of the "loyal" Liberals who stood firm is the possibility of electing two parliamentary representatives in the next election.

Of course, the split within the party has led to an erosion in voter support. In the last 6 months, the party did not manage to crawl above 2.7 percent and the lowest registered figure is 0.9 percent.

Expressed in terms of number of voters: 25,000 - 70,000.

8952
CSO: 3650/39

POLITICAL

SPAIN

FRAGA ON OPPOSITION ROLE, FUTURE OF CENTER

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 15 Nov 82 pp 19-22

[Interview with Manuel Fraga by 'Candido' in Madrid; date not specified]

[Text] We are all quite well informed about Fraga. Now, rather than a release of information, or simply rather than a release, there is an ambience. In this political interval, Fraga is a phenomenon more related to ambience than to information.

I visited "Fraquilandia," on Silva Street, where Popular Alliance [AP] has its headquarters. The individuals whom I saw were relaxed and satisfied. They are the opposition, although with an almost qualitative majority.

In my experience, Fraga has been simultaneously affectionate and sharp. This time, he is more affectionate and sharper. Julio Camba told the story of when a Greek was introduced to an American, the latter exclaimed: "So, you are a Greek! How interesting! An ancient Greek or a modern one?" Well, Fraga is both. I mean that he is affectionate and sharp. On this occasion, he took refuge in general ideas, although with some surprising exceptions. With them, he cuts short the path, and establishes a distance. But nevertheless, both facets of his nature appear connected, neither of them losing their features. Such is the symphony in si-flat fa sharp, of Fraga.

[Question] I find you thinner.

[Answer] No, by no means. What more would I wish?

[Question] At least more rested.

[Answer] I am not resting. I didn't rest much during the election period. But, in the end, I took a few days...this weekend. On Sunday I killed a few poor partridges. I am very well. I have the trace of a scar on my forehead, from when a photographer hit me with the camera.

("Queca," always so attentive to conversations, and even to those "off the record," tells him that the photographer had joined the entourage.)

Fraga exclaims: "He didn't seem like a professional to me! All right, let's begin; time is flying. Ask, ask your questions."

[Question] Yes, sir. What general reflections or conclusions have you accrued from the elections, considering the fact that there is no "natural majority" of the right in Spain?

[Answer] You must understand that the concept of society completely transcends the concepts of left and right. The other day, with the Pope, there was a crowd which was not of the left nor of the right. The new model of society, the society which met with the Pope, is based more on tradition than on innovation. To respond concretely to your question, I would tell you that the society prefers the lesser evil: the free market society, equality of opportunities rather than absolute equality. We shall see. In time, the majority will reveal its own self.

[Question] Yes, but it has already been revealed at the polls.

[Answer] Do you know why? Because the two so-called center options behaved treacherously toward the right, being right as well. With their votes, owing to the proliferating effect of the electoral phenomenon, the "natural majority" would have been revealed.

[Question] I think that the opposition also conceives of itself as a creative position. In this connection, do you have any bills, propositions, etc. ready?

[Answer] The opposition is creative, it must be creative. The parliamentary situations are typified because there is governing from the government and from the opposition. No, the opposition cannot be destructive. Now, of course, it must be taken into consideration that PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and Popular Alliance are based on two different models of society.

(I think that there is a single legal opposition, that of the model of society cited in the Constitution. But I let Fraga continue. What I think he means is that there are two ways of interpreting our model of society.)

The two parties are based on different models of society....All right, PSOE should do, without violence, what it has to do, and the nature of the alternative that we offered should be made clear. That will be made clear. We shall see what the Socialists do. There is no doubt that they have an absolute majority, and they cannot lose a vote. But Suarez never lost either, and yet we know what happened. Creativity from the opposition is necessary, so that, next time, the electorate may vote differently. Furthermore, there are devices such as amendment and the vote of censure. But the important thing is the creative aspect, the bills, and the progress of those bills.

[Question] What do you think of the notion that Alzaga's party, on the one hand, and the Communists, on the other, might form a parliamentary group? As for Alzaga, might he not bring the coalition's discipline into question?

[Answer] We have studied the subgroup. Yes, there has been speculation as to whether Alzaga, within the coalition, might assume one position or another. Nevertheless, there is a clause in the agreement that was signed stating that the possibility of an independent group would be subjected to a study. That group will be created or it may not; we shall see. There are some who think that there would be everything

to gain: for example, we would have more time to intervene, more turns. It is my view that there should be no change made in a regulation which is quite recent. As for whether the discipline of the coalition would be challenged or not, you must realize that discipline is not necessary among reliable individuals.

[Question] The second part of my question related to the Communists.

[Answer] I shall not go into that. However, in order to form a parliamentary group, a specific number of deputies is needed. So, I shall tell you the same thing that I did previously. A regulation should not be changed without a serious reason, much less when it was approved such a short time ago.

[Question] Do you think that Landelino Lavilla has any chance of remaking UCD [Democratic Center Union]?

[Answer] UCD has very little chance of being remade, and less with Lavilla. Lavilla led the party to disaster. My dear friend, this is the issue: What is fitting for Spain? What I predicted has been fulfilled. We were heading toward what is attained in the reliable countries: toward the political design of two leading parties, two parties which accept the Constitution, two moderate parties; because moderation is a demand of 80 percent of the Spanish people. And those nearly 2 million votes that were lost with the so-called center options (you know that I mentioned that matter of the center for the first time) will end up seeking their proper place.

[Question] Do you mean to tell me that the center is not a place?

[Answer] I do not consider the center necessary, and I do consider it to be counter-productive. In Germany, the center has warped the society. In Great Britain, the center has failed.

[Question] But here....

[Answer] Here, the center has caused Spain to function badly.

[Question] Then, according to you, the center should not exist.

[Answer] The fact is that it does not exist. What does exist is a moderate philosophy on politics. And that philosophy should combine the sociological center. Therein lies the success of the left, which absorbed Tierno's party, then the Andalucians.... That is what must be done on the other side.

[Question] Do you think that CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] will end up becoming dissolved in PSOE, and that this party will have Suarez?

[Answer] It is not up to me to make judgments concerning Suarez. I would simply tell you that it is not the same thing to run in elections from the government and from the street. We ran from the street, and you have seen the results. The significance of that party, with two seats, is rather problematical. Suarez is an irrelevant issue.

[Question] EL ALCAZAR, which has often attacked you, is now clearly and restrictively aligned with you. It is a clearcut example of what we call a useful vote. I think that it is the useful vote of the extreme right. That newspaper talks about a state of "confrontation," and vests its hope in a "synthesis through advancement." Has the position of that newspaper harmed you or not?

[Answer] I deny the report.

[Question] What do you mean? This was published under the signature of the editor of EL ALCAZAR.

[Answer] The extreme right, as you call it, has its reasons. No one would deny it the reason for its positions toward the burned flags and the assassinations. But the fact is that many of the votes received by Popular Alliance are not from the extreme right, but rather from what I term the vote from Oriente Square. These are unconditional votes, which do not accept conditions. The percentage of what you call the extreme right, the percentage of that vote was 1.5 percent of the total count. It could not be greater. The votes that I have added are national votes, votes that were seeking their place. The exclusively national vote has been cast in Germany, and in Italy, and democracy has not been endangered on that account.

[Question] But what you call a national vote, in short, the vote represented by EL ALCAZAR....

[Answer] You must understand, I would be the first politician to refuse support. I appreciate the support, whatever its origin may be, provided it does not impose conditions on me.

[Question] As for the "confrontation," doesn't that seem to you to be a dangerous proposition?

[Answer] The idea does not seem bad to me, because it is only natural that there be different parties. And, in the long run, EL ALCAZAR will be answerable for its opinions, not I.

[Question] That is from Don Juan Tenorio. I am referring to when Don Juan says: "for my steps on earth, may heaven answer, not I."

[Answer] You are mistaken. That is from Carrillo.

[Question] From Carrillo? I don't understand you.

[Answer] Carrillo has been mentioning heaven a great deal lately. He is a very devout man. When we politicians were received by the Pope, Carrillo was the only one who participated with a profound evangelical spirit.

[Question] Well, I don't know what to say. Incidentally, now that we are discussing Carrillo, to what do you attribute the downfall of the Communists?

[Answer] That downfall was only natural. They were bent on that business of Euro-communism, but it was an area which was already occupied. Furthermore, you must

realize that the Communist Party relies as much on the intellectuals as it does on the trade unions. And the intellectuals abandoned it.

[Question] Are you suggesting that PSOE occupies the Eurocommunist area?

[Answer] PSOE was always more to the left than it was supposed to be, and engaged in more demagoguery than it should have. And this was so because it was being pressured by the anarchists, just as it was by the communists later. But now, with the collapse of PCE [Spanish Communist Party], no one is blackmailing its left. It is a situation that has never occurred in Spain. Now, little excuses are no longer valid. We shall see; and we shall also see whether ideas and courage are lacking, as for example in the case of their failure to accept a debate on television.

[Question] I think that, in the debate, owing to the force of circumstances, all of you would have taken a stand against Felipe Gonzalez.

[Answer] By no means, my dear friend. They would all have taken a stand against me.

[Question] Nevertheless, Felipe Gonzalez was the enemy who had to be beaten.

[Answer] Nothing of the sort; everyone would have been against me, surely. But that did not cause me to back down.

[Question] The king told you and the other leaders that the most serious threat to democracy came from terrorism and coupism. We are all quite familiar with your view on terrorism. As for coupism, do you think that its roots are long and deep?

[Answer] The king had sound judgment. His remarks are already known, and I shall not stress them. As for coupism, the government has refused information on this subject. But, anyway, we know that the numbers are small, as they were on 23 February. There were very few and, furthermore, neither Milans nor Tejero was apprised of everything, as was proven at the Campamento trial.

[Question] Have you heard any mention of the military plots in Valladolid?

(I should note that I held this conversation with Manuel Fraga before the publication of the issue of TIEMPO preceding this one, wherein the topic was discussed, the details of which were unknown to me.)

[Answer] In this instance, only civilians were arrested. That may be like the unfortunate report about the organizational chart. It is unfortunate, and don't ask me anything more. It is all confused...but the matter can be brought under control. The biggest mistake is to insist, irritate and excite.

[Question] You claim that the matter can be brought under control. Let's hope so. But the fact is that the society is uneasy.

[Answer] I don't agree. There is uneasiness in Madrid. I have toured thousands of kilometers, and I have not seen that uneasiness which you claim. And I am the one who has covered more kilometers.

[Question] So the uneasiness in Madrid has been caused by the newspapers?

[Answer] I have already mentioned to you the unfortunate report about the organizational chart. The society should not be confused with the gossips.... you know, gossips in the sense of exclusive circles. There is talk for the sake of talking. It is for this reason that I am among the civilians that the military respect.

[Question] Do you believe that the military have been treated unfairly?

[Answer] Not unfairly, but indeed with disregard. The government in particular: Suarez, Rodriguez Sahagun, Gutierrez Mellado...all three made many mistakes. One cannot, with abandon, affect the career of men who have nothing more than it and their honor.

[Question] How did the other leaders react to the king's remarks?

[Answer] We were all in agreement. I stated afterwards that we should congratulate ourselves on the fact that the Crown was a witness to our agreement on moderation; because the Crown is the only moderating power. One of the advantages of the Crown is that it does not belong to a party. Even the Supreme Court has members appointed by the government. So the Crown is really the only moderating power.

[Question] Has the Pope's visit had any political benefit? Has it had any political significance? Is there a contradiction between the PSOE victory and the massive reception given to John Paul II?

[Answer] The visit has no political implications whatsoever. To be sure, when mention is made of topics which presuppose a model of society, it may seem to have them. For example, when he spoke about abortion with the clarity in which he did so. It is possible that some who voted for PSOE are reconsidering now.

[Question] Do you think that the news media reflected the election campaign clearly?

[Answer] The news media take sides too much. They do not attach importance to objectivity; that is, to reporting without additions or restrictions. There are no newspapers of that type, as there are in Great Britain. But, with some exceptions, they reflected the campaign quite faithfully.

[Question] Are you writing anything?

[Answer] I would like to delve into Spanish conservative thinking: Jovellanos, Balmes, Canovas. But I cannot, with all the work there is. I also have material for the second part of my memoirs.

[Question] What do you think of Felipe Gonzalez, as a person, a citizen and a Spaniard?

[Answer] I have the greatest respect for Felipe Gonzalez. But now we shall find out who he is. I wish him success, but that is precisely what remains to be seen.

2909

CSO: 3548/34

JOINT FRENCH-SPANISH ANTISUBMARINE MANEUVERS

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 8 Nov 82 pp 42-45

/Article by Carlos Yarnoz: "On the Submarine Hunt"/

/Text/ It was 1000 hours in the morning. In the waters of the Atlantic close to El Ferrol, three warships--two of them Spanish and one French--were engaged in the search for a submarine. Two hours later the sonar of one of the warships seemed to have located it. The code word "Romeo, Romeo, Romeo" emanating from the submarine indicated that indeed it had been located some 290 feet deep. The exercise was on target.

Recently in the waters of the Atlantic important Spanish-French naval maneuvers designated as "Finisterex 82" were held in which nine surface vessels took part--four of them French and the rest Spanish--together with three submarines, one of them belonging to the French Navy. To carry out these exercises consisting in searches and pursuit of submarines, the warships were divided into three groups, each of them consisting of three surface craft and one submarine.

TIEMPO observed the maneuvers and one of its writers sailed on board the destroyer "Mendez Nunez" (D 63) in which group, under the command of Navy Capt Ruiz Montero, the frigate "Asturias" (F 74), the French destroyer "Casablanca" (D 631), and the submarine "Isaac Peral" (S 32) participated.

The Chase Was On

The exercises got under way at 0730 hours in the morning with the sailing from the port of El Ferrol of all the participating naval units. In the zone designated as "Tramontana" the three surface vessels and the submarine had first made contact, the submarine being under the command of Lieutenant Commander Rolandi. Shortly after 1000 hours in the morning the submarine dived and half an hour later the search began.

At that time the destroyer "Casablanca" and the frigate "Asturias" dropped their VDS (Variable Depth Sonar) units into the water. The CIC /Combat Information Centers/ of the three craft were a genuine hive judging by the number of personnel to be found there and the tension under which they worked. All the detection systems (sonar and radar units) were functioning to the limit of their capabilities, verifying and registering all movements of surface vessels and anything moving underwater.

The results were promptly called out to the chief of the exercise, in this case the commander of the "Mendez Nunez," Cmdr Lopez Cortijo. For almost 2 hours the warships combed the area yard by yard, using varying formations to prevent the possible escape of the submarine. About noon, the VDS of the "Asturias" seemed to have detected the S 32. It communicated the information to the other two vessels and undertook the simulated discharge of a torpedo. It immediately transmitted to the submarine itself the latter's exact location. From the submarine, the transmission of the code word "Romeo, Romeo, Romeo" indicated that the submarine had indeed been discovered or "hit."

From that point the three surface vessels undertook successive simulated attacks against the submarine without the latter managing to escape from the ring. The exercise was a success.

In the subsequent hours and while the communications systems were being checked out, the naval group moved to the area designated as "Cierzo" where the warships undertook target practice. Indeed, the gun turrets of the three warships fired rounds at a target being towed by an aircraft with a cable about 1,000 meters long and at a target towed by another small vessel. In each case the data regarding hits on the target were communicated from the CIC to the firing guidance system from where orders were given to the crew of each gun turret (in the case of the "Mendez Nunez" the crew consisted of 21 men in each turret housing two guns).

Combination of Weapons

The most complex exercise took place beginning at 0730 hours on the morning of the third day of the maneuvers. Involved was a "Charlie 2" used in the detection of the same submarine with the cooperation of an aircraft and two helicopters. At the hour mentioned, and minutes after the submarine was detected by the radar units, an Orion aircraft of the Spanish Air Force flying from the Jerez base and two Navy Sikorsky helicopters from Rota (Cadiz) reached the area.

Once the exercise got under way the aircraft dropped into the water three sound buoys capable of locating the submarine through a system of triangulation while the helicopters were laying the Variable Depth Sonar units at various points. The surface vessels carried out similar operations.

Submarine's Triumph

An hour later, one of the helicopters located the submarine and communicated its position to the warships so that these might carry out their simulated attacks. However, on this occasion the submarine "Isaac Peral" evaded all pursuit and managed to escape through the "hole" left between the frigate "Asturias" and the French destroyer. It is the submarine which was triumphant now.

In any exercise of this type the most important element of a warship is its Combat Information Center (CIC), the vessel's real brain. Here all the data collected during the operation are analyzed, registered, and communicated. At the CIC of the "Mendez Nunez," under the command of Navy Lt Jesus Gonzalo Hernandez, three radar units (for surface vessel detection, aircraft detection, and navigation) and one sonar unit were being watched.

But one can also find in the CIC those systems which will shape, and already do so now, the war of the future. Involved are the countermeasure systems. In the "Mendez Nunez," an outdated vessel by now, the countermeasures are based on the use of two antennas located in the stern of the vessel as well as various universal band receivers. By means of this equipment the CIC can determine whether any other vessel or aircraft has the destroyer's blip on its radar. The destroyer will then begin to emit scrambling signals immediately.

Also, through the universal band receivers the destroyer's CIC records on a continuous basis any movement that it can pick up in an area of several kilometers. Subsequently, the tape recordings are analyzed.

Despite these advanced systems the warships of the Spanish Navy, as is known, need urgent modernization which the Navy's Restructuring Plan is striving to put into effect. Only in this way will the Navy be able to fulfill the mission that is entrusted to it.

2662
CSO: 3548/32

MILITARY

SPAIN

GEOSTRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF CEUTA, MELILLA

Munich EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE in German Oct 82 pp 437-441

[Article by Heinz Brill: "Spain and NATO--Spanish North Africa a Special Problem"]

[Text] The aim and content of current Spanish foreign policy may be summed up briefly as follows: "A clear European and Western orientation, special relations with South America, close relations with the Arab countries (not with Israel), a particular interest in problems of the Mediterranean area, solidarity with the African peoples and with all developing countries." This description by the dismissed Marcelino Oreja still manages to assign to Spain's foreign policy the kind of "bridging role" which Madrid would prefer to play above all else.

Geostrategically speaking, Spain's becoming a member--with special regard to the balance of power in Europe--is a plus for the alliance. Specifically this means:

- Establishing an overland bridge to Portugal;
- an increased possibility of controlling the maritime routes in the south Atlantic and the Mediterranean;
- a strengthened maritime presence on these seas and the possibility of relieving the U.S. Navy;
- a place of transshipment for reinforcements from the United States and logistical bases;
- strengthening NATO's conventional fighting power.

This also indicates that, as a possible NATO member, Spain might bring the alliance quite considerable liabilities as well as the universally recognized geostrategic advantages:

- The first liability is the fact that a new military coup in Spain still cannot be ruled out;

--the second liability is the two North African towns of Ceuta and Melilla, which are being claimed by Morocco;

--the third liability is the Spanish Canary Islands, which the Organization of African Unity (OAU) considers to be part of Africa.

Reportedly Madrid is considering defusing the problems of Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands by a solemn declaration that no NATO military bases are to be established there in peacetime. The very opposite way, however, is being planned by Madrid for Gibraltar, which has been in British possession since 1704 but is being claimed by Spain. Because the great majority of the population of Gibraltar rejects a handover to Spain, it has been the express intention to make it a NATO base.¹

The Spanish Geostrategic "Axis of Interests": Balearic Islands-Straight of Gibraltar-Canary Islands.

With the Balearic Islands, Gibraltar, the North African territories and the Canary Islands, Spain occupies a significant strategic position. From geo-strategic points of view, these lie on a "line of demarcation" between Eastern and Western spheres of influence.²

The pivot of Spanish worries is the "strategic vacuum"³ located south of this line or axis of Balearic Islands-Straight of Gibraltar-Canary Islands, which in the Spanish view could be filled by "holy alliances" from one day to another.

Before dealing with the Spanish overseas possessions on the opposite North African coast, let me make a few basic remarks about the terms of "enclave" and "exclave" being constantly used in regard to these territories. An exclave⁴ being constantly used in regard to these territories. An exclave is a piece of sovereign territory lying outside the integral national territory in a neighboring country. As far as the neighboring country is concerned, this same piece of land is an enclave.⁴ In most cases exclaves are also enclaves. The mutual aspect is not possible if an entire state is the enclave of another state.⁵

According to Martin Schwind, so-called "bases" which have become inserted in foreign sovereign territory must also be considered enclaves. The Spanish possessions of Alhucemas, Chafarinas and Penon de Velez de la Comera each take up only a few hectares of land on the Moroccan coast, but Melilla (12 square kilometers) and Ceuta (19 square kilometers) too occupy such an insignificant amount of space that they appear to be overwhelmed by the Moroccan territory around them. It may be surprising, Schwind writes further, that Gibraltar, apparently separated from Spain by a narrow isthmus, is also called an enclave, but the misgivings are dispelled if in the definition of an enclave given above the term "sovereign territory" is interpreted as including territorial waters.⁶

The Towns of Ceuta and Melilla

Melilla and Ceuta are described by the Spaniards not as colonies nor as exclaves or enclaves but as "presidios."⁷

Ceuta

The Spanish port of Ceuta, with a population of about 100,000 people, is situated opposite Gibraltar on the northern coast of Morocco. About 84 percent of the inhabitants are Spanish citizens.⁸ Ceuta lies 25 meters above sea level on the isthmus (2 kilometers long and 350 meters wide) of an 8-kilometer-long peninsula. The extreme point of the peninsula extending northeast into the Albora Sea is the Cape Punta Almina. The frontier runs from the east side of the Benzú Bay to the mouth of the Lower Taraja on the Mediterranean coast. Altogether Ceuta takes up an area of about 19 square kilometers and is part of the Province of Cadiz. The Rock of Gibraltar and the Djebel Moussa (856 meters) northwest of Ceuta are described as the "Pillars of Hercules."

Ceuta is an important port. It harbors a fishing fleet of about 1,200 small craft. The harbor of Ceuta can be used by ships with a draft of up to 10.5 meters. The population makes its living primarily off the processing of fish, shipbuilding and ship repair.

The town is divided into a Moorish old town and a European new town. Its modern urban development with straight streets and higher buildings began in 1912. Starting at the foot of the Acho, Ceuta extends beyond the isthmus (crossed by a canal) and then spreads in the form of a fan.

Apparently of Phoenician origin, the town received the name of Septem Fratres in Roman times; this the Arabs abridged to Sebta, which then became today's Ceuta.

In ancient times the importance of Ceuta rested on its favorable strategic position at the gate of the Mediterranean.

In the year 429 AD it was occupied by the Vandals. In 534 Justinian I wrested it from the Vandals, incorporated it in the Eastern Roman Empire and newly fortified it. In 618 it fell to the Visigoths, and then in 711 to the Arabs. Bitterly fought over during the Arab invasion, the town then gained exceptional importance as a buffer between Spain and North Africa. Ceuta was conquered by the Almoravides in 1084, by the Morinids in 1273 and by John of Portugal in 1415. In those centuries Ceuta was the most important town of Mauretania. In 1580, after the unification with Portugal, Ceuta was given to Spain, and in the Peace Treaty of Lisbon it was definitively assigned to Spain on 13 February 1668. Since then Ceuta has remained in continuous Spanish possession. Only in 1810 was it briefly turned over to the British. In the Peace Treaty of Tetuan, on 26 April 1860, the territory under the jurisdiction of Ceuta was expanded substantially. In the fight against the Riffi, Ceuta was the starting point of Spanish operations. On a slope of Monte Hacho the "memorial stone of the victory convey" can be seen to this day. The stone contains the footprints of Franco and an image of the Holy Virgin of Africa. Though it may make a kitschy impression, the memorial appropriately pictures the two pillars supporting the Franco regime--the army and the church.⁹

When the former possession of Spanish Morocco was returned in 1956, Ceuta remained under the Spanish sovereignty as a Plaza de Soberania. Just as then, its role as a military base predominates today.¹⁰ This is also a reason for the West to direct Spanish-Moroccan relations into reasonable channels again.¹¹

Melilla

The Spanish port of Melilla, with its approximately 100,000 inhabitants, lies on the north coast of Morocco, 10 kilometers south of the Cape Tres Forcas (the northern tip of the Beni Sicar or Gelaia Peninsula). About 2 to 15 meters above sea level, it comprises an area of about 12.3 square kilometers.

In the past decades the town has developed into an important harbor for exporting ores, with a mole 2 kilometers long. By and large it is a question of shipping iron and lead ores from Beni-Bou-Yafrour 20 kilometers away. Ships with a draft of 5 to 11 meters can dock here. Since Morocco became independent in 1956, transshipment has decreased greatly, but as late as in 1966 it still amounted to about 1.03 million tons. In 1958 the Melilla fishing fleet caught about 9,000 tons of fish (mainly sardines), which in part were processed in canning plants. Otherwise Melilla has no industry worth noting. The population is almost exclusively Spanish. Most of the town is crossed by broad straight streets. It is divided into two halves by the small Rio de la Olla. The core of the old town, with its powerful walls of fortification, traversed in part by tunnels, and with its old houses has largely preserved its 16th century character.

The Imperium Russadir, situated in a strategically favorable position on a small bay of coastal erosion (Cala), was destroyed by the Vandals in the 5th century and rebuilt again by the Arabs, as Melilla, on the same spot. In 1497 the town was conquered by the Spaniards. In the Hall of Guards of Melilla there is today a town museum which contains selected mementos of a turbulent past. At the entrance a large wall map bears an inscription which reads, in translation:

Melilla was Spanish

18 years before the Kingdom of Navarra,
162 years before Roussillon became French,
279 years before the United States came into being.¹²

From 1912 to 1956 Melilla was part of the former Protectorate of Spanish Morocco.

As a result of its position as a Spanish enclave on Moroccan territory, Melilla lacks a connection with the hinterland.¹³ The town is wholly dependent on Spain for supplies. It has therefore remained predominantly a military base. Melilla's strategic importance derives from its geographic position. Its importance has, however, increased even further since the neighboring Algerian ports of Mers el Kebir and Oran granted base rights to the Third Squadron of the Red Fleet.¹⁴

The Spanish Islands and Groups of Islands Along the Opposite North African Coast

Following the end of the protectorate over Morocco, the units of the Spanish Armed Forces serving there were withdrawn to places under Spanish sovereignty--that is, in addition to Ceuta and Melilla, to the three small possessions called Plazas Menores (Velez de la Comera, Penon de Alhucemas and the Chafarinas Islands).¹⁵ The combined size of these three territories is about 1 square kilometer.¹⁶ Legally these towns and places are an integral component of Spain, forming a province of their own with Ceuta as the capital. A special geographical position is occupied in this connection by the Island of Alboran.

Here are the salient data concerning the individual territories:

Penon de Velez (de la Comera) is a small rocky peninsula with an area of about 2 hectares.

Spain has had a "presidio" (Spanish possession with a military installation) along the coast of Morocco opposite the mouth of the Wadi Tameda since 1508. At that time it was a question of a "genuine" island not quite 100 kilometers from the African mainland, but in the meantime its character has changed completely since the sea has receded more and more.

The soil washed up by the river gradually created a connection with the mainland. This process, which connected Velez de la Comera with Africa took a very long time, however. It began by making the strait a shallow strip of sand which people could wade across.

At the time of Ferdinand the Catholic, Velez de la Comera got into Spanish hands. It was conquered by Capt Pedro Navarro on his pursuit of the Berbers during his Oran campaign.

Velez is a big rock 80 meters high. It is the shape of a triangle, the longest side being 225 meters long. The island is not all of one piece: in the east there is a tiny island (110 by 75 meters) which is connected with the main island by a wooden bridge. The core of the town, consisting of more than 50 houses, was erected in the south. The island has 500 inhabitants, with many families having spent all their lives on this Spanish territory.

Alhucemas Islands (Spanish name of the capital: Penon de A.)¹⁷ In the southwest corner of the bay and 600 meters in front of the beach the Penon and the three Islands of Alhucemas are suited. The Penon of Alhucemas or "Hayers en-Nekor" (the island of San Agustin and San Carlos de las Alhucemas, the first Spaniards on this island, is rocky and extends over 15,000 square meters, being 170 meters long, 80 meters wide at its widest point and about 700 meters in circumference) was conquered on 29 August 1673 by the Prince of Montesacro along with the islands Islota del Mar and Islota de Tierra, and this dealt a mortal blow to the Berbers who dominated the Mediterranean in the 16th and 17th centuries. Since that time (the rule of Charles II) these islands have been part of Spain.

The Chafarinas (Islas Chafarinas in Spanish), a group of three small volcanic islands with an area of about 0.75 square kilometers in all, are situated about 26 kilometers east of Melilla and about 10 kilometers northwest of the mouth of the Qued Mouloya. They lack both vegetation and water. The central Island of Isabella II is the only one that is inhabited and has a light tower. In addition to some fishermen's settlements, it harbors a small garrison. The Congress Island, with 135 meters above sea level, reaches the greatest height among the islands and, being more than 1 kilometer long, is also the longest. The smallest and easternmost island, the Royal Island, has a cable station. The Chafarinas for a long time were hideouts of Berber pirates and did not become Spanish for good until 1848. Water is supplied from the southeastern Spanish mainland.

In ancient times these islands bore the name of Tres Insulas (the three islands), and no one bothered about them until General Serrano took them over in behalf of Spain on 6 January 1848. In 1849 France tried to make the islands its own but finally acknowledged Spain's greater claim.

Recognition of Spanish sovereignty by Morocco is laid down in article 4 of the agreement concerning the implementation of the treaties regarding Melilla, an agreement signed in Morocco (Marrakesh?) on 5 March 1849.

Alboran, an uninhabited small island in the Mediterranean (35 degrees 55 minutes north, 3 degrees 2 minutes west) 56 kilometers north of the Cape Ires Forcas (North Africa) and 90 kilometers south of the Spanish coast at Motril, is a cable station of the Ameria-Albroan sea cable and has a manned light tower.

This island in the small western corner of the Mediterranean, which had been ignored by all the world, suddenly received attention when it became known that the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet was using the waters around Alboran for moorage. Moreover this area offers excellent opportunities for checking on the movements of ships in the Strait of Gibraltar.¹⁸ Not least for this reason, the Spanish Government is stressing more than ever the military importance of Ceuta and Melilla and the Island of Alboran situated north of Melilla for securing the western exit of the Mediterranean.

Spanish-Moroccan Relations With Special Regard to Problem Areas: Ceuta and Melilla

Morocco continues to be a problem for Spain's "expansion southward."¹⁹ After the dispute over the Spanish possessions on the African west coast on the Atlantic (Spanish Sahara), the relations between Madrid and Rabat have been burdened by Morocco's claim to the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.²⁰ While again ceding to the sultan in 1956 the north of Morocco which had been placed under Spanish protectorship, Spain kept as bridgeheads on the African coast facing it the two garrison towns with about 200,000 almost exclusively Spanish inhabitants and their area of only a few square kilometers. Ceuta, opposite Gibraltar, has been continuously Spanish since 1415, Melilla since 1497.

More than ever, Madrid is stressing the military importance of Ceuta and Melilla for securing the western exit of the Mediterranean and is seeking to

interest NATO and particularly the U.S. 6th Fleet in protecting these external possessions which are in jeopardy and geographically exposed.

In the Moroccan-Spanish agreement of 1956, the independent Kingdom of Morocco on its part declares the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla to be "places of its sovereignty."²¹ For a long time the Moroccan claims concerning the enclaves were dormant. The open conflict between Morocco and Spain which is continuing to this day began in 1975. At that time Morocco threatened to attack the Spanish enclave of Melilla if Spanish soldiers were to fire at the "Moroccans peacefully marching into the Sahara." Spain responded to the Moroccan threat with a naval demonstration along the Moroccan coast.²² The Moroccan argument that Spain after all was demanding Gibraltar from Britain was rejected by Madrid with the argument that Ceuta and Melilla had never been part of Morocco and that the Spanish population had settled there long ago and had firm ties with European Spain.

In an agreement, Morocco pledged at that time not to demand in the next few years the towns of Ceuta and Melilla which it had claimed and most of whose population was Spanish.²³

Yet Morocco brought up the subject after that whenever it believed that the Madrid stand in the Sahara question was approaching the stand of the Polisario Liberation Front. At first, like Algeria and initially also Mauretania, Spain had advocated self-determination in its former colony of West Sahara and had prepared a plebiscite. Morocco, on the other hand, claimed the territory from the start. The International Court at the Hague, which Morocco appealed to, did not agree with the Moroccan view that the West Sahara used to be Moroccan territory.²⁴ This decision notwithstanding, Madrid dissociated itself from the Polisario's right of self-determination, not least because of Morocco's claims to Ceuta and Melilla. Diplomats and influential politicians in Madrid soberly speculated about a barter deal: Morocco was to be given the Sahara, and in turn guarantees were to be received concerning Ceuta and Melilla.²⁵ Madrid knows only too well the weight of Morocco's point of view in the enclave question.

The Moroccan claims were put forward with particular clarity by Foreign Minister Bucetta in a lecture at the Jesuit Georgetown University in Washington, when he said: "Morocco has not yet achieved its territorial unification since the Moroccan towns of Ceuta and Melilla and some small islands on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco have not yet been retrieved."²⁶ Bucetta also made a threatening allusion to a possible interest of Morocco's in the Canary Islands, saying that "these incidentally are situated only a few miles from the Atlantic coast of Morocco."

Shortly before that Mucetta had already stated in a speech before the UN General Assembly: "The restoration of Morocco's territorial integrity is an ineluctable process about which there can be no dialogue or any kind of negotiations." The last time the Moroccan foreign minister claimed the Spanish towns of Ceuta and Melilla was in a speech in Casablanca in May 1979.

Summary of the Geostrategic Aspect

Geostrategically speaking, in light of the ever-increasing presence of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean and owing to its influence in that area and the unstable position in the Maghreb countries, the possibility of a threat to NATO from the southern flank must be taken into consideration. In that case the strategic position of Spain is of the utmost importance.

Summing up the thoughts expressed here about the Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines and border areas, it should be stated that Spain has outstanding geostrategic prerequisites for developing a maritime policy both on the national and on the international level. Spain's main maritime and strategic interests are directed toward the focal point of the Strait of Gibraltar, with its pertinent ways of access. Surveillance and control of this strait is the priority aim of this security policy. On the other hand Spain, both in the western Mediterranean and in the eastern Atlantic definitely could fulfill important tasks not limited to insuring the protection of its overseas demands and defending its national integrity but relating to the defense of the West against the strategy of expansion being pursued by the Soviet Union on the oceans of the world.

Owing to the role they play in the surveillance of the Strait of Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla will gain in geostrategic importance. The Balearic Islands' position in the western Mediterranean is ideal and, given the employment of pertinent means, can be the key for closing the door to the Middle East. Spanish membership in NATO makes possible the establishment of bases and the installation of early-warning systems and facilitates the deterrence vis-a-vis threats from the southern flanks.²⁷

FOOTNOTES

1. For the state of the debate, see, in lieu of many other references, Erich Hauser, "A NATO 'Invitation' to Madrid?--The Alliance Is Not Going To Interfere in the Internal Spanish Debate," FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, No 206, 7 Sep 81, p 13.
2. Cf Ulricke Borchardt, "Spain and NATO," issued by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at Hamburg University, No 19, Aug 80.
3. The term "strategic vacuum, used i.a. by General Gundersen (NATO Military Committee), signifies that "strategic vacuums," as history has shown, as a rule are filled by rising powers.
4. Cf also Robinson, G. W. S., "Exclaves," as quoted by Martin Schwind in Allgemeine Staatengeographie [General Geography of Nations], Berlin New York, 1972, p 39.
5. Martin Schwind, *ibid*, p 39.
6. Martin Schwind, *ibid*, p 41.

7. Hans Dieter Kley, "Ceuta and Melilla," DIE ZEIT, No 50, 4 Dec 81, p 55.
8. Dr Wolf Tietze, article on Ceuta in Westermanns Lexikon der Geographie, published on behalf of Georg Westermann Verlag, Braunschweig, 1968, p 624.
9. Hans Dieter Kley, "Ceuta and Melilla," DIE ZEIT, No 50, 4 Dec 81, p 55.
10. Cf Rainer Mennel, "Spanish-Moroccan Relations--An Economic and Geostrategic Analysis," WEHRKUNDE, No 1, 1976, p 24.
11. Dr Wolf Tietze, article on Melilla in Westermanns Lexikon der Geographie, published on behalf of Georg Westermann Verlag, Braunschweig, 1970, p 295.
12. Otto Habsburg, "Afrika ist nicht verloren" [Africa Is Not Lost], Vienna/Munich, 1964, p 63.
13. Note: Before the suspension of the Spanish protectorate, the small Moroccan locality of Nador (Villa Nador) on the border of Melilla exercised the functions of the military and civilian administration of the eastern Rif Mountains. It is a station on a branch terminal line leading from Melilla southwest into the mining region of the eastern Rif Mountains, of hardly any importance following the suspension of the Spanish protectorate. Cf article on Nador in Westermanns Lexikon der Geographie, Braunschweig, 1970, p 450.
14. Cf Rainer Mennel, "Spanish-Moroccan Relations--An Economic and Geostrategic Analysis," WEHRKUNDE, No 1, 1976, p 24.
15. Cf Otto Habsburg, "Afrika ist nicht verloren. Schwarz und Weiss--Partner, nicht Feinde" [Africa Is Not Lost--Black and White as Partners, Not Enemies] Vienna/Munich, 1964, p 54.
16. Martin Schwind, "Allgemeine Staatengeographie," Berlin/New York, 1972, p 543.
17. Dr Wolf Tietze, "Alhucemas Islands," Westermanns Lexikon der Geographie, published on behalf of Georg Westermann Verlag, Braunschweig, 1968, pp 91-92. Article "Alhucemas Islands" in Meyer Enzyklopaedisches Lexikon, vol 1, Mannheim/Vienna/Zurich, 1971, p 719.
18. Cf Wolfgang Hoepker, "Wie rot ist das Mittelmeer? Europas gefaehrde Suedflanke" [How Red Is the Mediterranean? Europe's Southern Flank in Jeopardy], Stuttgart, 1968, p 36.
19. Cf Wolfgang Hoepker, "Wie rot ist das Mittelmeer? Europas gefaehrde Suedflanke," Stuttgart, 1968, pp 38-39.
20. Lieutenant General Alvarez-Arena, "We Will Not Give Up Ceuta," SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 9 Aug 74.
21. Rolf Goertz, "Madrid Fears Attack on Enclaves," DIE WELT 10 Feb 75.

22. Cf article "Spain Sends Men-of-War to Moroccan Coast," SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 10 Feb 75; article "Morocco Protests Spanish Men-of-War," SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 13 Feb 75; article "Spain Protects Its Enclaves--Tanks and Infantry Transferred to Moroccan Border," SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 2 Jul 75.
23. Cf article "Before an Agreement Between Madrid and Rabat," FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 27 Feb 79.
24. Cf article "Morocco's Claims to Ceuta and Melilla--Connection With Spanish Position in West Sahara Conflict," FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 27 Feb 79.
25. Cf Friedrich Kassebeer, "Poker Game for Spanish Sahara--A Desert With Phosphates Arouses Neighbors' Greed--It Is Considered Possible That Madrid Will Become Protector of New Colonial Exploitation," SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 12 Jul 75.
26. As quoted in article "Dispute Over Ceuta and Melilla," FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 12 Oct 78.
27. Cf article "Effects of NATO Membership on Spanish Armed Forces," BALETIN DE INFORMACION PARA LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS, No 16, Oct/Nov 81, pp 4-10, issued by the Spanish Ministry of Defense.

8790
CSO: 3620/68

MILITARY

SWEDEN

ARMY, NAVY BEGIN TRAINING PROGRAM FOR FIRST WOMEN OFFICERS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Nov 82 p 18

[Article by Bengt Falkkloo]

[Text] Over 500 young women want to be officers in the navy and army. By last Monday, which was the deadline for applications, 375 had applied for the navy and coast artillery, while 138 had applied for one of the army's various branches. Those who are selected and pass their tests in December will begin their national service training next summer and may receive their commissions in 1986.

This is the first year that the army and navy have opened their training programs to women. It is the fourth year in a row that the air force has allowed women to apply to become officers, but it has not yet counted up this year's applications.

When the selection process is complete, those accepted will be tested in one of the country's six area recruiting offices under the same conditions as the young men.

Commissions in 1986

If they pass the tests, they will participate in 15 months of voluntary national service training beginning next summer. After that, they will compete for admission to the Officers War College. If everything goes well, they will become second lieutenants after 2 years (in 1986).

Lt Col Claes-Goran Blomkvist of the Army Staff says: "No women will be assigned to combat posts, but naturally, they will be assigned to commands during the final part of their national service training."

"And the platoons they command will consist only of guys."

The figures for the various branches show that 25 want to go into the artillery, while 25 have chosen antiaircraft defense, 12 the engineers, 24 the signal corps, 44 the maintenance and supply units, and 2 the Army Technical School.

"Seventeen have also applied for combat units, but we will discuss it with them and try to put them somewhere else."

Not Room for Everyone

Of those who have applied, 46 have already completed their education--that is, at least the 2-year upper secondary school--while the others will have completed their education by next spring.

The navy has also received a great many applications. More than it needs.

Maj Bengt Sjoholm of the Naval Staff says: "This year, 375 young women have applied for the positions open to women. But we need only 90 in the coast artillery and 150 in the fleet, so 135 will never get in."

Smaller Boots

Until now, the army has used women only in the Swedish UN battalion in Cyprus and at the Swedish UN hospital in Lebanon.

Claes-Goran Blomkvist says: "And in those places everything has gone very well. It is true that there are a number of minor practical problems to be solved--for example, we have to arrange for marching boots in slightly smaller sizes and women's underclothing. But there will no doubt be special clothing allowances for such things--it will certainly be taken care of."

The air force has had several years of experience with women.

Inger Martensson, who is a psychiatrist on the Air Staff, says:

"In the first year, we accepted 29 young women, and 19 of them are now attending the Officers War College. In the second year, we accepted 24, 14 of whom have continued. Last summer, 37 started their national service training, and 6 of them dropped out after a few weeks."

Better Grades

"Our experience has been very good. Most often, those young women have gotten better grades from the start, and they have often been more highly motivated than their masculine colleagues. This means that they try harder and have done very well in such subjects as leadership and command."

If any of the young women being accepted as army officers advances as quickly in her career as the current army chief of staff, Lt Gen Nils Skold, she could become a general in the year 2004.

11798
CSO: 3650/35

MILITARY

SWEDEN

SUBMARINE INTRUSION INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE BEGINS WORK

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Nov 82 p 5

[Text] The so-called submarine investigating committee, headed by Member of Parliament Sven Andersson (Social Democrat), began its work on Tuesday with a visit to the East Coast Naval Base on Musk Island, from where the most recent submarine search, (in October) was directed.

The group's visit began with reports by Adm Christer Kierkegaard, the search leader, and Capt Emil Svensson, head of the analysis group, on the efforts made and results achieved during the submarine chase, which lasted for almost 3 weeks. The group then boarded a navy vessel to visit the places in Hars Bay and the Mysingen Strait where things had happened.

At Sven Andersson's request, there was even a depth charge attack on simulated targets at the northern barrier.

During the day, two more depth charges were dropped in the Mysingen Strait as part of what the Naval Staff called the normal training routine.

11798
CSO: 3650/35

MILITARY

SWEDEN

SOVIET PILOT IGNORES WARNING, FLIES IN RESTRICTED SPACE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Nov 82 p 10

[Text] Despite Swedish warnings, the Soviet pilot flew directly over a restricted area near Sandhamn. The Civil Aviation Administration is now lodging a protest with the Soviet aviation authorities and demanding an explanation.

The plane was on its way from Moscow to Arlanda Airport. As it approached Sandhamn, the pilot asked the Swedish air traffic control service for permission to swing slightly off course to avoid a thundercloud. Permission was granted.

The pilot was later heard from again. He wanted to swing a little further off course, still citing the thundercloud as his reason. The control tower refused to go along with that, since he would then wind up directly over a restricted area.

The pilot paid no attention to the warnings, but flew into the forbidden area.

The Civil Aviation Administration views the violation as serious. And its checks do not show that there were any thunderclouds in the area at the time of the incident.

11798
CSO: 3650/35

MILITARY

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

ARMY ACQUIRING BOFORS ARTILLERY--The armed forces will place a supplementary order with the Bofors Corporation for artillery pieces for the Swedish Army (howitzer 77's). The order, which is worth 90 million kronor, represents 200 years of work in Karlskoga. The reason for the order is the difficult employment situation in the municipality of Karlskoga. That announcement was made to Parliament on Thursday by Minister of Defense Borje Andersson. It was part of his response to a question by Bengt Wittbom (Conservative), who was asking, among other things, for defense orders to be moved up and for more flexible rules on Swedish arms exports. The minister of defense said in his response that advancing defense orders is not a suitable way to solve the munitions industry's problems. Such orders only create even greater problems in the future. The procurement in question here was described before the defense resolution was reached as a "marginal objective" that could not be fitted into the minimum economic level. "We are happy with this order, but it does not change anything as far as the layoff notices we issued last week are concerned," says Ulla Carlstrom, head of the Information Department at Bofors. Carlstrom says: "This order was already provisionally included in our artillery production schedule, and we are grateful to note that it has been confirmed." [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Nov 82 p 8] 11798

CSO: 3650/35

GENERAL

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

NEW POLICE CHIEF BIODATA--President Kyprianou yesterday appointed Mr Theophanis (Phanis) Demetriou deputy police commander. The post had remained vacant since the sacking of Mr Pavlos Stokkos last month. Mr Demetriou joined the police in 1944 and in 1949 was declared the "best police constable". In 1955 he was promoted to sergeant and by 1956 he was a police inspector. He received training at Hendon College Britain in 1957/1958 and when Cyprus became a republic in 1960 he was made superintendent of police. Since 1976 he has held the rank of assistant police chief (operations). He is married with four children, three sons and one daughter. Mr Demetriou was born in Peristeronopygi village of the Famagusta district (now in the occupied area) in April 1924. [Text] [Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 13 Nov 82 p 1]

CSO: 3500/311

OLDER POPULATION IN THE NORTH IN YEAR 2000

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 5 Nov 82 pp 18, 31

[Article by Eugenio Sonnino: "In 20 Years Northern Italy Will Be an Old People's Realm"]

[Text] We are going through a phase of intense demographic change. At the beginning of this century, 1 million babies were born in our country per year, out of a population of 32 million. Today, with a population of 56 million, about 600,000 babies are born. The lengthening of the life span must be considered an intrinsic element in the processes of the overall development of industrialized societies. The increase in the number of family nuclei is due both to the aging of the population and the isolation in which society leaves the elderly.

Increasing attention is being devoted to the problem of the elderly in the European countries in general and in all industrialized countries. The world of "mature economies" is discovering an important element of its evolutionary processes: an increase in the old, mature population parallel to a decrease in the young (up to age 14) population. Like all demographic processes, the process of aging in itself attracts the attention of scholars and politicians, during this phase of intense demographic transformation characteristic of the 1970's; but it should also be considered the product, in its turn, of a long-term, general process involving profound changes in behavior, habits, and the general characters of these societies.

At the root of the relative growth of the older population is the intense and prolonged reduction in the birth rate which has been clearly characteristic of all industrialized countries, including ours, since the middle of the 1960's. At the beginning of the century, about 1 million babies were born per year in Italy out of a population of 32.5 million. Today a population of 56 million gives birth to little more than 600,000 babies per year. The continuous decline in the birth rate--interrupted only for a 5-year period in the first half of the 1960's, when the birth rate climbed back up to 900,000 or more births per year--has given rise to the absolute and relative increase in--the progressive "accumulation" of--older individuals born of the wealthier generations of the past.

We shall not analyze here the factors at the root of the process of the decline in the birth rate, but we will note that models of cautious reproductive behavior seem to be deeply rooted in today's collective mentality due to the economic crisis. They are related to the general picture of the type of development and modernization characteristic of our society, but it is difficult to clearly identify the mechanisms that have governed the relationship "development = reduction in the birth rate." Development of industrialization, urbanization, and exodus from the countryside, increased education, expansion of individual consumption, changes in women's roles and mentality are some of the general factors behind the emergence of a need and wish to limit births, by means of birth control methods that have only recently become adequately widespread.

That is why the aging of the population must be considered not just an emerging problem and permanent characteristic of the near future, but also an intrinsic element of the processes of overall development of industrialized societies. In Italy, the proportion of citizens 65 or older was 6 percent of the total population in 1901, 7.4 percent in 1961, 11.3 percent in 1971, and 15.3 percent in 1981. It is reasonable to estimate that it will be 16 percent 20 years from now. In absolute figures this means that if there were about 7,700,000 Italians over 65 in 1981, there will be over 9 million in 2001. The picture of the nation is changing: while in 1951 there were about one third as many old people as children under 15, in 2001 the two groups will be the same size. This is a picture not only of numbers but also of economic, social, family and emotional relationships. At one time many children never even knew all their grandparents. Today grandparents are with them in the family for a long time, but young people have fewer brothers, sisters and cousins in their family circles. The picture is no different in other European countries with respect to all these processes and relationships. An overall figure tells us that in the 21 countries of the Council of Europe, persons over 65 were estimated at 50 million in 1981.

It is important to remember, in considering the consequences and the complex implications of the aging process, both the absolute and the relative figures. The people who will be 65 years or older in the year 2001, for example, are those who are now at least 45. Their numbers are estimated based on the assumption, which is correct enough in the absence of extraordinary events, that their future life span can be derived from present levels of mortality. So from the point of view of programming, they are already a fact. This prospect must be faced in the immediate future, in any event, with the necessary commitment in terms of attention, resources and energy.

If we reflect, as we should, about the resources to be invested in this direction and the repercussions on society of the attention and investment likely to be directed this way, it is interesting to note, for example, the number of older people per productive unit. Let us look at the figures: in 1951 there was 1 person over 64 for every 8 people of working age (15-64). As a consequence of the demographic processes I have mentioned, by the end of the century this proportion will be 1 older person for every 4 individuals

in the central age group. Naturally these proportions should be considered merely as quantitative terms of reference to be inserted in a context of economic and social relations and productive processes not yet determined. Nevertheless, they should be borne in mind today and in the near future.

These considerations bring us to some evaluations of the effects of the aging process which scholars are attempting to delineate. In one of the reports discussed at the European Demographic Conference in Strasbourg last September it is pointed out that it is probably an illusion to believe that reduced expenditures for education and young people's health--which could result from the reduction in births (but it is not certain to)--can compensate for the increase in expenditures for health care due to the increased numbers of older people (see D. Maillat, "Consequences économiques du ralentissement démographique").

It is not so easy to foresee the effects the changing age composition of the population will have on production characteristics and on development in industrialized societies. But in this connection, the influence of other macroeconomic variables and the processes of international relations--from the cost of oil to that of the dollar--seem relevant and even decisive.

Other scholars, on the other hand, stress the enormous growth in the social security burden which will fall on a decreasing base of producers 15-20 years from now, if present systems and regulations remain fixed. Exercises about the future economic consequences of aging can vary widely, and can be motivated by the most varied intentions, not excluding that of stimulating a revival of fecundity. What I think should be emphasized is that economic, political and cultural initiatives to be taken about the elderly, and for an improvement in the life of the third age, should, among other things, make an effort to resist any temptation to demonize the elderly, considering them responsible for emerging and already emerged economic problems. The fact is that besides the undoubted economic problems, the intensification of the aging process offers all developed countries the opportunity and the duty to question themselves about the achievements and the desirable goals of the process of development itself, in terms of the social and cultural frames of reference of civilized society. The debate about the participation of the elderly in productive life should be expanded and qualified, together with the development of assistance and the fight against marginalization. This is a difficult fight, because the evil weed of isolation of the elderly seems to have taken root more or less everywhere. Suffice it to remember, in this connection, the ongoing processes of the organization of family life, in which the parents-children nuclear family is becoming increasingly dominant. One consequence of this is an extremely rapid increase in the number of households: there are 33 households per 100 persons in Italy today, whereas in 1971 there were 29; in 1961, 27; and in 1951, 25, as a joint result of aging and the isolation of the elderly in autonomous households.

The fact that this is one of the aspects of the problems about housing in Italy has been given little thought so far. The universe of the elderly remains entirely to be explored, and it would be wise to enter it in close contact with the elderly themselves.

In Italy all these aspects of the problem should be considered bearing in mind the territorial division involved in the aging process, which will lead to a foreseeable concentration of older persons, equal to almost half of the whole population over 65, in northern Italy.

This is not a new feature in the country's history, but its intensification will require greater commitment and sensitivity.

Population Over 64 in Italian Regions

2) regioni e ripartizioni	1) (valori assoluti, in migliaia)					
	3) censimenti			4) previsioni		
	1951	1961	1971	1991	1996	2001
Piemonte	400,7	495,9	607,8	703,6	736,3	759,8
Valle d'Aosta	8,6	10,0	12,6	16,3	17,3	17,7
Lombardia	528,7	687,5	905,9	1.225,9	1.313,7	1.386,4
Trentino-Alto Adige	60,0	69,5	90,5	117,8	123,9	125,8
Bolzano	21,9	27,3	38,1	54,7	58,6	60,9
Trento	38,1	42,2	52,4	63,1	65,3	64,9
Veneto	300,3	351,0	445,6	601,7	638,9	656,9
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	112,9	137,8	172,2	203,7	199,9	192,6
Liguria	166,6	223,5	287,6	346,0	352,8	349,2
Emilia-Romagna	308,4	392,1	500,2	699,9	727,2	732,8
<i>Italia settentrionale</i> 5)	1.886,2	2.367,3	3.022,4	3.914,9	4.110,0	4.221,2
Toscana	310,7	391,5	497,6	650,6	671,4	671,1
Umbria	65,9	80,4	96,1	141,0	149,4	150,7
Marche	110,8	132,8	164,4	237,7	250,8	255,3
Lazio	232,7	322,3	439,6	712,7	788,2	843,2
<i>Italia centrale</i> 6)	720,1	927,0	1.197,7	1.742,0	1.859,8	1.920,3
Abruzzi	139,5	153,7	143,2	192,8	204,8	209,1
Molise	41,5	52,2	54,3	55,3		
Campania	282,6	349,6	442,4	619,0	676,2	711,3
Puglia	228,8	273,2	333,9	477,7	521,4	552,5
Basilicata	41,5	48,1	61,5	86,4	94,0	100,0
Calabria	138,7	160,9	200,8	280,1	299,8	316,1
Sicilia	358,0	423,2	507,9	680,6	723,3	748,2
Sardegna	99,8	124,4	150,5	195,6	210,7	221,6
<i>Italia meridionale e ins.</i> 7)	1.288,9	1.533,1	1.881,7	2.584,4	2.784,5	2.913,8
<i>totale</i> 8)	3.895,2	4.827,4	6.101,8	8.241,3	8.754,3	9.055,3
9) (valori percentuali, rispetto al totale della popolazione)						
2) regioni e ripartizioni	3) censimenti			4) previsioni		
	1951	1961	1971	1991	1996	2001
Piemonte	11,39	12,67	13,71	16,35	17,52	18,58
Valle d'Aosta	9,09	9,90	11,57	14,95	16,27	17,17
Lombardia	8,05	9,28	10,60	1390	15,05	16,15
Trentino-Alto Adige	8,21	8,84	10,74	13,60	14,36	14,72
Bolzano	6,56	7,28	9,19	12,65	13,52	14,11
Trento	9,60	10,25	12,24	14,55	15,21	15,34
Veneto	7,66	9,13	10,81	14,00	14,99	15,61
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	9,20	11,45	14,19	17,60	17,87	17,85
Liguria	10,64	12,88	15,51	20,68	22,02	22,88
Emilia-Romagna	8,70	10,69	13,00	18,72	20,09	21,02
<i>Italia settentrionale</i> 5)	8,91	10,45	12,11	15,68	16,77	17,64
Toscana	9,83	11,91	14,33	18,77	19,82	20,37
Umbria	8,20	10,12	12,39	17,91	19,35	20,01
Marche	8,12	9,85	12,09	17,08	18,26	18,94
Lazio	6,97	8,14	9,37	13,79	15,16	16,26
<i>Italia centrale</i> 6)	8,31	9,88	11,63	16,11	17,33	18,14

Abruzzi	8,28	9,83	12,28	15,49	16,49	16,96
Molise	6,50	7,34	8,74	10,94	11,67	12,06
Campania	7,10	7,98	9,32	11,52	12,26	12,76
Puglia	6,61	7,46	10,20	13,85	14,97	15,88
Basilicata	6,78	7,87	10,10	12,87	13,48	14,01
Calabria	7,98	8,96	10,85	13,45	14,10	14,48
Sicilia	7,82	8,76	10,21	11,86	12,57	13,08
<i>Italia meridionale e ins.</i> 7)	7,29	8,25	9,97	12,37	13,09	13,53
totale 8)	320	9,54	11,28	14,54	15,49	16,16

Key:

1. (Absolute figures, thousands)
2. Regions and divisions
3. Census
4. Estimates
5. Northern Italy
6. Central Italy
7. Southern Italy and islands
8. Total
9. (percentage value with regard to the total population)

Population Over 64 in Italy

	(1) valori assoluti (in migliaia)	(2) % sul totale popolaz.
3) Nord	3809,7	14,7
4) Centro	1570,8	14,4
5) Sud e isole	2361,5	11,6
6) totale	7742,0	13,5
7) Fonte: Istat		

- Key:
1. Absolute value (in thousands)
 2. Percentage of the total population
 3. North
 4. Center
 5. South and islands
 6. Total
 7. Source: Istat

Demographic Indicators in Council of Europe Countries Around 1981

	1) popolazione (in migliaia)	2) popolazione per Km ²	fasce di età (in %)		
			4) 0-14 anni	5) 15-64 anni	6) oltre 65 anni
Austria	7.505	90	20,5	64,0	15,5
Belgio	9.855	323	20,3	65,4	14,3
Cipro	629	69	24,6	65,5	9,9
Danimarca	5.119	119	19,9	65,4	14,7
Francia	54.085	98	22,0	64,5	13,5
Rft	61.658	248	17,8	66,7	15,5
Grecia	9.642	73	22,8	64,0	13,2
Irlanda	229	2	27,3	62,8	9,9
Italia	57.140	49	30,6	58,7	10,7
Liechtenstein	26	190	21,7	64,8	13,5
Lussemburgo	364	161	22,8	68,3	8,9
Malta	318	141	19,0	67,5	13,5
Olanda	14.209	1.006	24,3	67,4	8,3
Norvegia	4.092	348	22,1	66,3	11,6
Portogallo	9.905	13	21,9	63,1	15,0
Spagna	37.801	108	26,1	63,5	10,4
Svezia	8.323	75	25,4	63,6	11,0
Svizzera	6.314	20	19,1	64,3	16,6
Turchia	45.880	159	19,8	66,4	13,8
Gran Bretagna	56.010	59	37,5	58,0	4,5
Totale (7)	392.472	232	21,1	64,0	14,9
		97	23,3	64,0	12,7

Fonre: Consiglio d'Europa, Conferenza demografica europea, 1982. (8)

Key:

1. Population (thousands)
2. Population per km²
3. Age group (%)
4. 0-14 years
5. 15-64 years
6. Over 65
7. Total
8. Source: Council of Europe, European Demographic Conference, 1982

9855
CSO: 3528/36

END